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1. INTRODUCTION: THE FUTURE OF BANKING IN 
CESEE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Ernest Gnan
On 23 June 2010, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank and SUERF jointly organised a
conference on “The Future of Banking in CESEE after the Financial Crisis”,
incorporating the SUERF Annual Lecture, delivered by Manfred Schepers, Vice
President, Finance, at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
on “The role of domestic financial markets in an integrated Europe”. This
SUERF Study compiles selected papers presented at this conference. To capture a
full picture of the information and views collected at the conference, this intro-
duction also summarises findings from presentations given orally at the confer-
ence only.
In Chapter 2 of this Study, in his introductory keynote speech, “Micro to Macro:
New Focus in Financial Stability” Governor András Simor, Magyar Nemzeti
Bank, mentioned that countries – especially in CESEE – which had grown fast in
the run-up to the crisis had relied heavily on external funding. These countries
had, however, also suffered more in the recession, with foreign exchange lending
playing an important role in this. Foreign banks had been very loyal and had
maintained their exposure in the CESEE region. In this context, the Vienna Initi-
ative had played a key role. The Governor outlined three lessons that could be
drawn from the crisis:
1. strong reliance on external funding makes countries vulnerable. A sound fis-
cal policy and a low inflation commitment are now required to lower risk
premiums. A stronger focus on domestic financial markets and domestic sav-
ing is needed. Domestic capital markets need to be developed. This will con-
tribute to stability in the future;
2. macroprudential supervision needs to be enhanced. Supervision should look
at cyclicality, interdependence, and the link with macroeconomic develop-
ments. Central banks should play a much more important role in this field:
they already have experience with the lender of last resort function, they fol-
low financial markets very closely, and price and financial stability are closely
related;
3. there is a need to foster prudent lending at the micro level. Foreign currency
lending is curtailed in many countries. But prudent lending practices should
go far beyond this. Many countries got into trouble not because of too lax
fiscal policies but because of excessive private sector indebtedness. Supervi-
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sion needs to take a much more active role to prevent this. The Basel propos-
als would penalize parent-to-subsidiary funding, which is crucial for many
CESEE financial systems. Intragroup funding is stable and should therefore
not be penalized.
The Governor’s main message was that the post-crisis focus should be on achiev-
ing sustainable convergence with disciplined fiscal policy, higher household sav-
ings and an improved macroprudential framework.
Chapter 3, the 2010 SUERF Annual Lecture delivered by Manfred Schepers, Vice
President, Finance, EBRD, on “The role of domestic financial markets in an inte-
grated Europe” examines the fundamental change that financial markets are cur-
rently undergoing, which is driven by international regulatory reform as well as
national initiatives, and the need for fiscal consolidation as well as current
account adjustments. Banks need to revamp their business strategies, product
mix, funding methods and risk management. Financial integration has brought
great benefits to CESEE. Domestic financial systems are in turn an important
stepping stone for reaping the full benefit from an integrated EU financial market.
Cross-border banking groups have introduced effective banking practices into
CESEE countries. The resulting access to finance has allowed growth and catch-
ing up. This has now been challenged by the financial crisis. Financial integration
provided a false sense of security and prompted countries and agents to take
excessive risks. Reliance on external funding has exacerbated foreign exchange
credit expansion prior to the crisis. Unregulated foreign exchange borrowing is a
source of risk which needs to be addressed. More balanced and reliable funding
practices need to be developed. At the same time, cross-border lending within
banking groups was a source of resilience in the crisis. Banks also recapitalised
their subsidiaries appropriately.
The development of local capital markets has lagged behind the development of
cross-border banking, particularly for corporate financing. Access to euro area
markets and the prospect of euro area participation reduced the incentive to
develop domestic markets. Lack of domestic saving also contributed. Bond mar-
kets in many CESEE countries are dominated by government issues. Other coun-
tries have relied on foreign financing in euro. The development of functioning
domestic corporate bond and covered bond markets is desirable. Demand will
need to be created domestically through competitive terms and conditions and
efficient market infrastructure. Otherwise the dominance of bank financing will
be self-perpetuating. There are important obstacles to be overcome: For longer
maturity bond markets to develop, transparent secondary market pricing as well
as swap markets and recognized benchmark rates need to be established. Efficient
clearing and settlement infrastructures need to be installed.
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It is in the hands of national authorities to establish the necessary conditions for
well-functioning domestic capital markets. The prospect for euro participation
should not distract from this need. Even eventual euro area participation will not
make national bond markets redundant, given existing home bias. Domestic
financing is a useful complement for integrated euro area capital markets for
smaller companies with a mostly domestic investor base and may turn out more
resilient in crisis periods.
The first session of the conference drew a picture of the post-crisis macroeco-
nomic environment for banking in CESEE. In addition to two papers published
in this Study in Chapters 4 and 5, experts from the International Monetary Fund
and the European Central Bank presented findings of recent reports by their
respective institutions.
Irina Ivaschenko, International Monetary Fund, presented a study on “Capital
Flows and Financial Fragilities in Emerging Europe” prepared by Johan Mathisen
and Srobona Mitra in the context of the May 2010 IMF Regional Economic Out-
look1. Emerging Europe benefited from much larger capital inflows prior to the
crisis than Latin America or Asia but built up fragilities. Subsequently, the region
experienced a much deeper recession than other emerging economies. Naturally,
this observation conceals large variations within the region. This experience
prompts the questions of how to ensure a healthy level of foreign investment into
emerging Europe for the future, while preventing excessive capital inflows and
improving the stability of an increasingly internationally integrated financial sec-
tor. Empirical estimates show that different types of capital inflows are influenced
by different factors. Structural factors and the outlook for potential growth deter-
mine FDI inflows. Cross-border loans are primarily influenced by macroeco-
nomic policies. Portfolio debt reacts to fiscal policies and capital controls, and
portfolio equity flows are mostly influenced by growth prospects. In CESEE
countries, inflows sometimes exceeded the healthy levels required by conver-
gence, e.g. reflecting non-sustainable asset and credit booms. Higher risk-taking
by the financial sector amplified the effect of macroeconomic policies on capital
inflows. The resulting build up of financial fragilities was often associated with
fixed or heavily managed exchange rate regimes. Foreign currency loans were
both caused by demand and supply side factors and constitute an important
source of financial fragility. Macroprudential policies temporarily slowed inflows
into banks and altered the composition of inflows, with capital controls proving
partly successful in reducing portfolio debt inflows. Policy recommendations for
countries already seeing a resumption of inflows include exchange rate flexibility
(where possible), tight fiscal policies (particularly under pegs), use of prudential
1 International Monetary Fund (2010), Regional Economic Outlook: Europe, May 2010, pp. 27-51, available for
download from: www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2010/EUR/eng/ereo0510.htm.
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tools (e.g. capital requirements on foreign borrowing) to curb excessive risk-
taking by banks, and temporary capital controls. Countries not yet seeing a
resumption of inflows may wish to reorient their growth strategy towards the
tradable sector and to improve intersectoral labour mobility, lower skill mis-
matches and address infrastructure bottlenecks.
Reiner Martin, European Central Bank, gave a presentation on “Euro Area
Enlargement – the ECB Convergence Report May 2010”2. Countries with hard
pegs had experienced much sharper recessions in the crisis than countries with
floating exchange rates. Also, before the crisis inflation in countries with a peg
soared to much higher levels than in floating exchange rate countries. At the same
time, current accounts in hard peg countries experienced much larger deficits
before the crisis and a much sharper correction during the crisis than floating
exchange-rate countries. General government balances were broadly balanced in
hard peggers before the crisis, but turned sharply negative during the crisis. They
consistently exhibited sizable deficits already before the crisis in countries with
floating exchange rates, with some further deterioration in the crisis. The enlarge-
ment process stipulated by the EU Treaty means that in practice the time for a
non-ERM II EU country to enter the euro area is three years. The crisis implies
that very few countries currently comply with the fiscal deficit and government
bond yield criteria, while the debt criterion is satisfied by all CESEE countries.
Only three countries currently satisfy the inflation criterion and also only three
countries are currently members of the ERM II. Legal convergence has gained
increasing attention over recent years. As at 1 January 2011, Estonia joined the
euro area as its 17th member. Given the absence of a well-developed market for
long-term debt securities denominated in Estonian kroon, a broad-based analysis
of financial markets was conducted to evaluate compliance with the interest rate
convergence criterion. The presentation concluded with a number of economic
policy recommendations for Estonia relating to fiscal, wage and structural poli-
cies as well as measures to prevent credit booms in the future.
Chapter 4 by Markus Eller, Michael Frömmel and Nora Srzentic investigates the
question “What has driven private sector credit developments in CESEE?”. The
paper explores demand versus supply factors, the existence of structural changes
over time, the speed of adjustment of credit to macroeconomic fundamentals, and
sectoral differences. The paper shows a strong positive long-run impact of eco-
nomic activity and a largely negative impact of inflation on the level of credit.
Supply factors explain much of the variation in credit growth but their impact
differs across sub-periods. Periods of bank restructuring or crises trigger also
adjustment in credit. While before the crisis, country-specific developments were
2 European Central Bank (2010), Convergence Report, May – available for download from: www.ecb.int/pub/
pdf/conrep/cr200805en.pdf.
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important, the recent crisis had a considerable cross-regional impact. Macropru-
dential analysis should also analyse bank-related credit supply factors. If credit
does not adjust by itself to levels in line with economic fundamentals, regulation
might need to step in to make up for the absence of market self-correction.
In Chapter 5, Debora Revoltella and Fabio Mucci evaluate “The prospects for the
banking market in CESEE beyond the crisis”. While overall, banks in CESEE
withstood the crisis well, 2010 might turn out more difficult than 2009, given
necessary credit write-offs. Economic convergence will continue but the pre-crisis
dependence on external financing needs to give way to stronger reliance on
domestic savings. This implies lower growth prospects than before the crisis
(albeit still much higher than in Western Europe). This will also dampen growth
and profit prospects for banking business in CESEE. Risk premia are coming
down but remain above pre-crisis levels. Adjustment in retail banking lags behind
the one on corporate business. Profit prospects are in principle good, but adverse
scenarios need to be taken into account, with increased long-run volatility of
profits in several countries. Capital buffers are high for the banking systems as a
whole, but Basel III may still require adjustments. A revival of economic activity
in the region given high country risk and the need for tight fiscal policies should
focus on three pillars: 1) full use of EU funds (this can contribute 0.8-2.0 percent-
age points to annual growth rates); 2) improvements in competitiveness to com-
pensate for other long-term challenges such as ageing; 3) appropriate regulatory
measures.
The banking systems of the CESEE region also face substantial regulatory and
supervisory challenges in the aftermath of the crisis, especially in light of the fact
that foreign banks enjoy considerable standing in the region.
Session 2 was devoted to post-crisis banking models. Gergely Tardos, OTP Bank,
opened the session with a presentation on “Banking models in CESEE from a
domestically-owned bank’s perspective”. Before the crisis, banks’ aggressively
expansionary business strategies were characterised by rapid credit deepening,
cross-border financing, an emphasis on foreign currency lending, an increasing
role of mortgage loans, and substantial maturity mismatches (mortgage versus
short-term financing through deposits, parent bank financing, bonds and FX
swaps). Several aspects of this strategy were not sustainable, and the crisis trig-
gered a sudden stop or even reversal. The roots of foreign exchange lending lie in
fixed or quasi-fixed exchange rate regimes, imprudent fiscal policies raising risk
premia on domestic currency loans, and underdeveloped or non-existent local
currency covered bond markets. Euroisation can be sustainable in converging
economies if the domestic currency experiences sustained real appreciation. How-
ever, it reduces the scope for national monetary policy action. Also, real conver-
gence can be suddenly reversed in a crisis or stopped by imprudent fiscal policy.
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Therefore, if foreign currency lending were to be continued, it would need to be
accompanied by prudent fiscal policy and stricter banking regulation (debt to
income ratio, loan to value ratio, capital adequacy). The introduction of Basel III
(capital adequacy, leverage ratio, liquidity coverage ratio, net stable funding
ratio, counter-cyclical provisioning or capital rules) will likely cut back banks’
loan generation capacity. As regards growth prospects in CESEE, much of the
current account adjustments have been achieved, debt levels are mostly (except
for Hungary) still comparatively low, and the overheating of domestic demand
has gone. After the crisis, catching up will again result in higher growth (albeit
slower than before the crisis) than in Western Europe, and also banking penetra-
tion will catch up. But growth patterns will differ across countries, economic
structure will be important. Banking markets will also grow more slowly and will
be less driven by credit. Cross-border strategies will be negligible, there will be a
revival of local currency loans. Mortgages will be important, financed by pension
savings.
Jiři Škorvaga, Českà spořitelna a.s., addressed “Changes in the CESEE Retail
Banking Arena”. Business before the crisis was characterised by high growth, low
cross-selling, low average income per client, a dominance of interest income, low
accumulation of wealth, low cost per employee, high variable pay, various types
of branch formats and growth. In the changes ahead there will be winners and
losers, depending on their differing business models, which may quickly need to
be adjusted to changing circumstances. The new environment is characterised by
new regulation, new governments, low growth, and more consumer protection.
Also customers will change: less wealthy customers were hit more badly, there is
less appetite for credit, safer products are preferred as pensions are an important
issue, the new, internet-driven customers are less loyal and more sensitive to pric-
ing. Customers will remain to be different, some being profitable, others not. The
most profitable customers are either very wealthy or rather poor (the latter due
to their need for credit). Competition will rise. Both universal and specialised
banks can be successful. International groups with a consequent regional strategy
will be better positioned. Customer value has to be weighed against immediate
profit. M&As are not the answer, alliances look more promising. A very high
degree of customer satisfaction will be crucial to increase customer loyalty. Prod-
uct policy will be influenced by lower information asymmetries, fees and spreads
will be under pressure, deposits and lending will remain crucial for profitability,
and substitutes (life insurance, pension schemes and investment funds) are a solu-
tion only in the log run. Regarding distribution policy, cross selling requires com-
mitment and client loyalty, with trust having been dented by the crisis. Efficiency
(standardisation, centralisation, automation) needs to be traded off against flex-
ibility and agility. Mobile phone payments are an important future product area.
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Cornelius Walter, McKinsey & Company Inc., Budapest, presented his ideas on
“CEE banking models in the new normal”. Due to the crisis the global banking
revenue pool lost USD 350 billion (11%), mostly from increasing risk cost. East-
ern Europe was hit particularly hard. Despite dark clouds, there is a high-growth
scenario conceivable with slower volume growth but a moderation of risk costs.
However, also several adverse scenarios are conceivable, stemming from a) too
light regulation, b) fragmented markets and tough regulation, c) another severe
crisis, with governments no longer being able to save the financial system a sec-
ond time. The current stars are located in Asia, but Eastern Europe should con-
tinue to be an attractive market. For Eastern Europe there are a number of both
positive (above-average future growth after the crisis, continued potential for
increasing bank penetration, global banks’ involvement in CESEE banking sys-
tems) and negative (CDS spread volatility and sensitivity, slow down in volume
growth, reduced profit margins, high risk charges, capital constraints) risk fac-
tors. In the “new normal”, the gap between the best and worst performers will be
wider. Those who do not adjust quickly enough will vanish. Successful Eastern
European players pursued either a leverage or a clear niche strategy in the past,
the problematic middle players had a hard time; this trend will strengthen consid-
erably. Key success factors will thus include an aggressive portfolio strategy, con-
scious risk selection and risk mastering, lean operations, secure funding, system-
atic preparation for downside scenarios and the ability to react quickly to chang-
ing circumstances if necessary, and appropriate regulatory management.
Session 3 addressed issues in supervision. In Chapter 6 of this study Malgorzata
Iwanicz-Drozdowska presents her views on “Deposit insurance systems – lessons
from the crisis for CESEE banking systems”. Deposit insurance systems are a
crucial element of financial safety nets but need to be designed properly to avoid
moral hazard and problems in crises. The empirical evidence on the possible links
between the existence of deposit insurance coverage and bank failures is mixed;
some more recent studies suggest a u-shaped relationship: optimal deposit insur-
ance coverage should be less than full. Indeed, this was the case in most EU and
non-EU CESEE countries prior to the crisis. Coverage varied widely across EU
countries, though. After the Lehman collapse and Icelandic crisis, EU govern-
ments increased guarantees to mostly EUR 50,000 or EUR 100,000 and cancelled
co-insurance by depositors, with some countries introducing blanket state guar-
antees, i.e. de facto state financing. It is difficult to measure and compare the ex
ante strength of deposit insurance schemes, given incomplete data. High concen-
tration in the banking sector raises the required level of deposit insurance. In
CESEE countries, branches of foreign banks are according to the EU Directive
covered by the home country deposit insurance scheme. As the case of Iceland
shows, the home country rule may in practice have its limits, if the home country
is not able to honour the resulting liabilities. Deposit insurance is of limited rele-
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vance if a bank is in any case ‘too big too fail’ (provided the home country has a
sound fiscal position ensuring the rescuing of the bank in case of problems). The
author concludes by making a number of suggestions for changes in deposit
insurance schemes, such as abolition of blanket guarantees and the re-introduc-
tion of co-insurance by depositors, access for host countries to supervisory
reports on hosted banks, and the collection and publication of data on eligible
and covered deposits in all EU countries.
In Chapter 7, Petra Kalfmann examines “Changes in Risk Management Practices
after the Crisis – the Hungarian Perspective”, drawing on a questionnaire among
practitioners in seven large Hungarian banks covering 60% of total assets. Most
banks have a risk strategy approved by the Board, and in the majority of banks
the crisis has triggered considerable changes. The role of the risk management
organisation has increased. Risk awareness by top management has increased
since 2008. An evaluation of operative risk management processes showed that
institutions commonly reported tightening of risk management processes across
all business areas (retail, SME, large corporate, project finance, work-out). In the
retail business, the most important tightening happened in judgement criteria,
required coverage and the work-out process. Behavioural scorecards, covering
customers’ past behaviour, gain in importance. Thus, risk appetite decreased, and
the significant tightening is likely not to be temporary. For corporate clients tight-
ening occurred mainly in judgement criteria, work-out process, monitoring proc-
ess and limit setting. For SMEs the loan origination process as well as monitoring
and work-out will be tightened. Top managers receive comprehensive risk reports
on the aggregate risk indices, capital intensiveness and portfolio quality on a
monthly basis, reflecting considerably increased risk awareness with top manage-
ment. Currently common risk measurement tools, such as probability of default,
are mostly regarded as mature, robust and reliable. The majority of banks use
stress tests to evaluate potential impacts of extreme situations on risk levels.
Banks are very much aware of reputational risks and put a lot of emphasis in
customer relationship management and regular measurement of its quality. Risk
aspects were incorporated into incentive systems in all banks. Remaining chal-
lenges include IT support for risk management systems and the permanent sus-
tainability of a risk-conscious corporate culture as well as the concept of respon-
sible banking.
In the session, Zsuzsanna Kardosné Vadászi from the Hungarian Financial Super-
visory Authority, also addressed “New regulatory and supervisory challenges
after the financial crisis”. Work was currently underway on an overhaul of finan-
cial system regulation and supervision building upon the G20 principles and
actions from November 2008 and the De Larosière report from February 2009.
Steps undertaken or under way relate to deposit insurance, credit rating agencies,
SUERF2011_1.book  Page 12  Friday, March 11, 2011  9:54 AMINTRODUCTION 13
larcier
Solvency II, an amendment to CRD II and III, a new supervisory architecture, the
registration of alternative investment fund managers, amendments to the Pro-
spectus Directive and procedures for improved cross border crisis management.
Future steps include a more conceptual change in deposit guarantee schemes,
investor compensation schemes, CRD IV, the Market Abuse Directive, MiFID
and Derivatives, UCITS depositories, implementation of the measures for Sol-
vency II, rules for crisis management and resolution, corporate governance, and
amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV). The European
supervisory architecture has been thoroughly reformed, including as new bodies
the European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC), the European System of Financial
Supervision (ESFS), comprising the European Banking Authority (EBA), Euro-
pean Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). There will be new cooperation agree-
ments, while existing competences of national supervisory authorities remain. A
number of challenges in regulation remain: the ambitious regulatory reform (over
30 initiatives) requires speedy conclusion by Spring 2011. Impact assessments
and a careful assessment of regulatory risks, including risks on growth, need to
be prepared. Transitional arrangements need to be devised, the effectiveness of
the new supervisory framework will also depend on future financial innovation.
Consistency between the EU and international regulatory frameworks can be a
challenge, too. While EU rules are binding, many international initiatives are not.
There is a risk for the EU of running ahead with no way back. The scope of
regulation might differ. A tension between principle-based versus rule-based reg-
ulation approaches remains. Challenges in supervision include inter alia tensions
between global financial services provision and national supervision, the relation
between macro and microprudential supervision, and the convergence of super-
visory practices.
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First of all, I would like to thank SUERF for organising this conference here in
Budapest. At the same time, I must admit that I feel sorry for conference organisers
nowadays, because when you organise a conference, you have to arrange every-
thing for several months in advance, but by the time the conference takes place, it
is possible that the world has changed so much that people are busy thinking about
different issues. Of course, I would not say that the agenda of this conference is not
timely and relevant, but just to remind you: when people were talking about fiscal
policy a few months ago, they were saying that it is not yet the right time to with-
draw the fiscal stimulus, because the economy is not on the right track, and now
everybody was talking about withdrawing the fiscal stimulus yesterday. Similarly,
when you are talking with a banker in Budapest nowadays, he probably only wants
to talk about fiscal policy from the aspect of the banking tax that the government
is trying to levy on the banks, while all other issues seem to be irrelevant. Neverthe-
less, I shall try to stick to the original topic and hopefully it will be interesting
enough in itself for today’s discussion.
In my speech, I would like to describe the growth model in the CEE region before
the crisis and the role of the banking sector in this model. Then, I would like to
talk about the consequences of the crisis, and finally I would like to conclude with
the main lessons that we have learned from the crisis.
2.2. THE PRE-CRISIS GROWTH MODEL
2.2.1. Growth from Foreign Funding
Before the crisis, those countries that relied to a large extent on external funding
seemed to grow faster than other countries in the CEE region (Chart 1). The only
exception here is probably Hungary in the period of 2005-2007, where there was
no excess economic growth compared to the core EU Member States, despite the
high indebtedness. That was due to the fiscal adjustment in this specific period
resulting in smaller growth potential.
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Chart 1. Gross External Debt and Average GDP Growth Above the EU-15 Average in 
CEE Countries, 2005-2007
Source: Joint External Debt Hub, IMF WEO Database – October 2009, National Bank of Romania, MNB.
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2.2.2. Credit Growth and External Funding
Before the crisis, the CEE region was characterised by stunningly high credit
growth (Chart  2), which resulted in dramatically decreasing net savings
(Chart 3). Savings even became negative in the Baltic countries, while in the case
of Visegrád countries, it was much lower than the average of the core Eurozone
members. As a result, economic convergence had to be financed from abroad.
The loan-to-deposit ratio and the proportion of external liabilities to total liabil-
ities increased significantly between 2004 and 2008 in the CEE region, and in
most of the countries – with the exception of Slovakia, the Czech Republic and
Poland – these ratios exceeded that of the Eurozone (Chart 4).











2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Visegrád countries (CZ, HU, PL, SK) Baltic countries (LT, LV, EE)
Average of European periphery countries (GR, SP, PT) Average of core European countries (DE, FR, IT)
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Chart 4. Loan-to-deposit Ratio and External Liabilities of Banks in the CEE Region
Source: Eurostat, central banks of the countries.
2.2.3. Foreign Currency Lending
In several countries, the vigorous credit growth was driven by foreign currency
lending. Before the crisis, there was a clear correlation between the growth of
foreign currency lending and the growth of external debt in these countries
(Chart 5). In Hungary, one of the main reasons for the emergence of foreign cur-
rency lending was the loose fiscal policy, which resulted in high government debt
reaching 80 per cent of GDP in 2009. This ratio does not seem excessive com-
pared to the Eurozone, where it is above 100 per cent in some countries, but it is
relatively high in the CEE region. High government debt obviously contributed
to the high risk premium, which the country and particularly the government had
to pay on the market. Fiscal policy also narrowed the scope for monetary policy
to reduce the inflation rate and achieve price stability. Furthermore, Hungarian
monetary policy was constrained in using all of its tools by the existence of the
exchange rate band. Consequently, Hungary ended up with high nominal interest
rates. The gap between the interest rates on the Swiss franc, Japanese yen or euro
and the forint was huge. Coupled with an exchange rate band, which did not
allow the forint to fluctuate freely this led to a situation, where it was almost an
obvious choice or seemingly an obvious choice for borrowers to take on loans in
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sively. The answer is that they were convinced by the convergence story, and they
were very optimistic about their future income flows. They thought that Hun-
gary’s convergence process would be fast. Furthermore, they expected that the
euro would be introduced within a few years, thus exchange rate risks seemed to
be limited for a 20 to 25-year mortgage loan. Considering the supply side, Hun-
gary, just like other CEE countries, had a liberalised financial system, and had
foreign-owned banks provided with funds from the international markets and
from their parent banks to satisfy the demand.
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Chart 6. Causes of the Emergence of FX Lending
Source: Own illustration.
2.2.4. Banks’ Perspective
From the perspective of the banks, and especially from the perspective of foreign
banks, they were very keen to provide all the sources, as banks were highly prof-
itable in the region. The average return-on-equity (ROE) of banks in different
countries in the period of 2004 to 2008 (Chart 7) was higher in the new member
states than the average of the core EU countries. Generally, new member states
offered tremendous opportunities for Western banks to earn outstanding profits
across the region, leaving them eager to extend loans in these markets.
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Chart 7. Average Return on Equity of Banks in Different Countries (2004-2008)
Note: Due to differences in national accounting, taxation, and supervisory regimes, FSI data are not strictly
comparable across countries.
Source: IMF.
Considering the soundness of the banking sectors in the CEE region, everything
was alright as long as there were no wide fluctuations in exchange rates and as
long as funding was freely available from international markets. The banks
looked sound: even in 2008 their non-performing loans were not excessively high
compared to the Eurozone (Chart 8) and their capital adequacy ratios were well
above the regulatory minimum (Chart 9).
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Chart 8. Banks’ Non-performing Loans to Total Loans in 2008
Note: Due to differences in national accounting, taxation, and supervisory regimes, FSI data are not strictly
comparable across countries. Source: IMF.














































































































































































































The CEE region was hit particularly hard during the crisis. As a result, external
funding became much more expensive (Chart 10). In some cases not freely avail-
able, exchange rates fluctuated widely and that seriously affected not just bor-
rowers, but the banks as well. The crisis had severe effects on the macroeconomic
situation in general as well, which was exacerbated by high indebtedness in sev-
eral countries. A simple chart clearly shows a negative correlation between net
external debt and GDP growth in 2009 (Chart 11), illustrating that the higher the
external debt was, the deeper the recession was in the given country. The bad
news is that this is not only valid for the crisis, but over the long term as well. The
forecast of the IMF shows that excessively indebted countries have a worse eco-
nomic outlook for the next 5 years than less indebted ones (Chart 12).
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Chart 11. Relation between Net External Debt and GDP Growth in the CEE Countries
Source: Eurostat.
Chart 12. Economic Outlook and Debt Levels, EU-27 Except Ireland
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2.3.2. Parent Banks’ Commitment During the Crisis
It is also important to mention here that parent banks have been very loyal to the
region, which has not always been the case based on previous experience. Of
course, these banks had earned a lot of money during the past 20 years as men-
tioned earlier, but they also behaved decently during the crisis. They maintained
their exposure to the region (Chart 13), which was partly due to the so-called
Vienna initiative sponsored by international organizations such as the IMF, the
EU and the EBRD, which convinced the banks that it is their duty and also self-
interest to keep their commitment. However, this is not just charity from the for-
eign banks; there are also still tremendous opportunities in the region: profitabil-
ity and interest margins are still higher, while bank penetration, measured as out-
standing loans to GDP, is still considerably lower than in developed countries.
Therefore, there is strong growth potential as convergence is expected to con-
tinue.
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2.4. LESSONS WE HAVE LEARNED FROM THE CRISIS
2.4.1. Lesson 1: The New Growth Model (Lower Reliance 
on External Funding)
Now let us focus on some of the lessons that we learned from the crisis. The first
lesson seems to be obvious: strong reliance on external funding makes you vul-
nerable. So what do we need to do? First, we need disciplined fiscal policy and an
anti-inflationary commitment that I call together a sound policy mix. As a result,
risk premium and inflationary pressure will be lower, resulting in lower financing
costs. Second, we need to focus more on domestic instead of foreign savings in
funding contributing to the stability of the financial system and to sustainable
economic growth. Third, we need to support domestic funding by developing
domestic capital markets, because banks must rely more on long-term funding in
local currency in order to finance long-term local currency lending.
2.4.2. Lesson 2: Strengthening Macro-prudential 
Regulation
The second lesson is that we need to enhance macroprudential supervision.
Supervision must change after the crisis – I think everybody agrees with that.
Supervision should assess not only the risks of individual institutions, but risks at
the systemic level as well: it should look at cyclicality and other interdependences
between the financial system and the macroeconomic environment, and finally it
should look at interconnectedness within the financial system. Furthermore, we
believe central banks need to play a more crucial role in macroprudential policy
than in the past because of the close long-term connection between their price
stability goal and financial stability, their lender of last resort function, their accu-
mulated know-how in macroeconomic analysis and forecasting, and finally their
relatively strong institutional independence which is often necessary to push
through regulation affecting the financial sector.
Recently, every country has been reviewing its own supervisory system, and var-
ious solutions have been found. In many cases, we see that supervision is being
moved into the central bank, creating an integrated supervisor within the central
bank. Some countries have opted for the so-called ‘twin peaks’ model with super-
vision in the central bank, and market surveillance and consumer protection in
another agency. Finally, some countries are keeping supervision separate, but cre-
ating a body where authorities responsible for macroprudential and micropru-
dential supervision and regulation can coordinate their policies, findings and
information much more efficiently. Hungary opted for this last model in 2009. As
a result, the financial supervision received more tools and more independence
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from the government and the so-called financial stability board was established,
which is a high level forum to coordinate macroprudential and microprudential
supervision. The members of this financial stability board are the minister of
finance, the head of the supervisory authority and the governor of the central
bank. This body can propose regulatory changes to the government and to the
parliament on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. In other words, the government or the
parliament needs to respond within 15 days to say that ‘yes’ we are going to do
this, or ‘no’ we are not going to do this for such and such reasons. Subsequently,
the regulatory proposals cannot just be ignored, which has happened in the past,
not only in Hungary. The other important tool which the financial supervisory
authority has received is the right to prohibit or limit certain activities or certain
products for up to 90 days, if these activities or products can endanger financial
stability in the financial sector. This is a sort of cooling down period, where eve-
rybody can assess the risks associated with such products or activities, and regu-
lators in the meantime can take steps to regulate them or banks can decide to
continue or not to continue with the practices after 90 days.
What is important here is that the central bank is more involved in financial
supervision, but it has to be mentioned that it still does not have its own tools to
regulate the banking system. What a central bank can do is to draw the attention
of the other authorities, if it sees something is going wrong, propose regulation,
follow-up the implementation and report back to the public and to the decision
makers (Chart 14).
Chart 14. The Strengthened Macroprudential Framework of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank
Source: Own illustration.
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2.4.3. Lesson 3: Prudent Lending
The third lesson is that we need to foster prudent lending at the micro level. This
issue is usually associated with foreign currency lending in the CEE region, and
there are various measures that some countries in the region have taken against
foreign currency lending (Hungary, Austria, Poland). However, in my opinion,
prudent lending is not just about foreign currency lending. It is much more impor-
tant to emphasise that we need to focus on more prudent and anti-cyclical lending
policies in the region, since many countries ran into trouble not due to expansive
fiscal policies, but because the private sector assumed risks that, ex-post, proved
to be excessive. Therefore, private sector indebtedness needs to be controlled and
supervision needs to take a much more active role in maintaining sound and sus-
tainable policies.
2.4.4. The Major Challenge of Basel III
Finally, I would like to talk about the ongoing discussions on the international
regulatory environment. There are lots of new proposals which regulators are
busy working on. The Basel Committee and the banks are discussing various pro-
posals concerning the funding of the banking system, and capital and liquidity
requirements. In particular, I would like to draw your attention to one issue: a
major question for some CEE countries is the treatment of intra-group funding.
On the surface it is a market activity, so the proposed Basel III regulations treat it
as strictly like any other unsecured funding. Banks take short-term funding from
the market. It is there today, and it might not be there tomorrow. Subsequently,
when they set up liquidity requirements this type of funding is going to be penal-
ised. If you look at the CEE banks, most of the banks are subsidiaries of major
Western European banks (in the case of Hungary, about 70 per cent of assets are
held by banks that are subsidiaries of major Western-European banks), and most
of their funding comes from the parent banks. Approximately, three quarters of
the foreign funding comes from parent banks in the case of Hungary. As we have
seen, this is not a kind of funding that is here today, but disappears tomorrow.
This is a stable funding base for the Hungarian banking system. If this is going to
be penalised and treated similarly as short-term money market funding, then it
will have a major negative impact on the future lending activities and eventually
on potential GDP growth. I think this issue needs to be discussed thoroughly. In
my opinion, intra-group financing must be regulated in a way that favours the
build-up of the domestic deposit base, but does not penalise intra-group funding.
We believe, and the crisis has proven it, that this is a stable way of funding the
loan growth in the region.
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2.5. SUMMARY
The main message of my speech is that before the crisis, countries that relied to a
large extent on external funding seemed to grow faster than other countries in the
CEE region, but the crisis has shown that these countries with higher indebted-
ness suffered much more severely during the crisis and will continue to do so after
the crisis, as opposed to countries that had not built up such a large debt. There-
fore, after the crisis we should focus on achieving sustainable convergence with
disciplined fiscal policy, higher domestic household savings, and an improved
macroprudential supervisory framework to avoid future crises.
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3. DOMESTIC FINANCIAL MARKETS IN 
AN INTEGRATED EUROPE
Manfred Schepers
It is a pleasure to be here in Budapest today to deliver the SUERF Annual Lecture,
especially at a time when the European financial system needs to restructure to
address the challenges presented by the recent crisis in banking systems and sov-
ereign debt markets.
The topic of today’s conference is of keen interest to the EBRD. As you know, the
Bank has been deeply involved in the financial markets of central and south-
eastern Europe ‘CEE’ since the early years of transition and especially during the
recent crisis that has had such a profound impact on the region. We will remain
closely involved in assisting in the development of a more resilient banking and
financial market.
In my remarks today I would like to look beyond the banking sector and reflect
on the role and structure of domestic financial systems in the region, given their
integration within the European internal market. We are now in the midst of fun-
damental change in financial markets. Change is now driven on the one hand by
regulatory reform in the banking sector at the international and European levels
and on the other by the impact on the financial system of the changes required in
the management of fiscal and current account balances in particular across all of
Europe.
We are also seeing various national initiatives directed at the financial sector.
These measures are primarily in the prudential field, seeking to prevent the re-
emergence of the risks that were at the heart of the recent the crisis. At the same
time there are also broader regulatory measures, focussed on tighter consumer
protection, bans of certain financial products, and increased tax measures,
whether as a restitution of ex-ante or ex-post incurred costs or for mere revenue
purposes. It is clear, that across Europe, there is broad political support to re-
shape the financial sector that is seen as having played a major role in the sharp
economic contraction of the past two years.
In part as a response, many financial institutions are now revisiting their business
models – business strategies, product mix, funding methods and risk manage-
ment. The shape of the financial industry, its resilience and capacity to allocate
and provide capital efficiently, will be crucial for CEE’s continued convergence
process. So today’s gathering of financial market practitioners, regulators and
academic experts under the SUERF umbrella is particularly timely.
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I will review the record of financial integration in emerging Europe, largely
underlining the immense benefits it has brought to the region. The title of my
remarks – domestic financial markets in an integrated Europe – suggests a certain
perceived contradiction. In the end I hope you will appreciate that domestic,
national financial structures are indeed a critical stepping stone towards taking
advantage of the benefits of Europe’s integrated market in financial services.
3.1. THE RECORD OF FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN 
EMERGING EUROPE
Let me begin by reviewing the record of financial integration in Europe, and then
contrast this with the correspondingly slow progress in building local capital mar-
kets across Central and Eastern Europe.
A modern market economy requires an effective financial sector, providing debt
and equity capital and investments to the broader economy, thereby enabling sus-
tainable economic growth financed through balanced growth in domestic long-
term savings. Cross-border banking groups have introduced effective banking
practices from Western to Eastern Europe and this model of financial market
development has produced some impressive results. As a result, a modern and
effective financial sector has been established in many countries, with cross-bor-
der banking groups bringing capital, know-how and good governance to the
region. This access to finance has enabled the dramatic growth in investment and
consumption, which has provided for the increase in living standards across the
region and convergence between East and West.
This model has now been challenged by the global financial crisis and its specific
impact on Central and Eastern Europe. Financial integration was clearly –
although naturally – a source of contagion in the financial crisis that originated
in the advanced economies in the EU and US. After the event, cross-border bank-
ing is widely regarded as a significant factor in the overexpansion of credit, espe-
cially in foreign currency, which was a major contributing factor to the crisis. And
finally, the crisis management of large cross-border groups has proven to be chal-
lenging and complex in many countries, laying bare the poor coordination of
crisis management and resolution between home and host country authorities,
both within and outside the EU.
This has prompted the EBRD to have a critical look at the impact of financial
integration and the role of cross-border banks in our region. Our research,
including the findings of the 2009 EBRD Transition Report1, points out the com-
1 Available for download at: www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/transition/TR09.pdf.
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plex role of cross-border banking in the run-up as well as during the crisis. What
are the main findings?
– first, there were substantial long term growth benefits from financial integra-
tion in our region. Capital inflows in our countries have led to higher average
growth over an extended period, not just during the boom years. This finding
is remarkable in itself, but particularly because it seems to be unique to this
region. In other emerging markets the link between capital inflows and
growth appears to be far more tenuous;
– second, the role of cross-border banking during the crisis has been more com-
plex than is generally appreciated. While cross-border flows were one chan-
nel through which the crisis was transmitted from West to East, the structure
of cross-border finance – in particular, the fact that much of it was interme-
diated by subsidiaries on the ground as opposed to direct cross-border lend-
ing – turned out to be a source of resilience. Parent banks stood by their
subsidiaries during the crisis, and – with support and incentives by EU, IMF,
World Bank, EIB and EBRD under the Vienna Initiative – generally main-
tained their exposures. This cushioned the reversal of financial flows in the
transition region. Banks also recapitalized their subsidiaries appropriately,
thus directly supporting financial sector stability;
– third, while financial integration has done more good than harm, we must
address the vulnerabilities that resulted. By competing for market share in an
environment of ample global liquidity and FX stability, cross-border banking
became the chief instigator of an unprecedented credit boom in the transition
region. The result was steady erosion in lending standards, high private sector
indebtedness, which in turn can be linked directly to the output decline in the
crisis and which is a major obstacle for recovery today. Reliance on foreign
funding also exacerbated domestic lending in foreign currency. Large num-
bers of household and corporates borrowed in foreign exchange – Euro,
Swiss franc, even Yen, and in the CIS countries predominantly in US dollar.
This exposed many economies to the threat of mass bankruptcy in case of
devaluation. It also limited the ability for an effective crisis response by lim-
iting the use of the exchange rate to address export & import demand and
limiting the capacity of any monetary policy response;
– fourth, the lack of an appropriate crisis management and resolution frame-
work for cross-border banking institutions has been a clear shortcoming.
Many foreign subsidiaries are systemically important in their host countries,
though arguably played only a minor role in the supervisory and resolution
efforts in the home country. At times it has been unclear whether home coun-
try taxpayer funds would be put on the table for liquidity and capital support
to subsidiaries. Thankfully, the key home countries, including Austria, France
and Italy, did not hesitate to award exactly that support to the subsidiaries
across the region.
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While the integration of banking systems across CEE proceeded apace there has
been only limited progress in developing local capital markets. While most gov-
ernments have been important issuers in their local markets, and have gradually
extended maturities, there remains only a very shallow market for corporate and
bank-issued debt instruments. There are various reasons why the domestic capital
markets in CEE have not developed:
– the accession to the EU brought with it an expectation of eventual euro adop-
tion and underestimation of the potential FX risks. This resulted in govern-
ments, corporates and banks choosing to raise funds in the deep and compet-
itive euro loan and bond markets rather than in the domestic markets;
– the market for domestic short and long-term savings has not developed at a
pace to be able to provide sustainable long-term capital. In several countries in
CEE many investors in fact preferred to keep their savings in euro or US dollar;
– it has naturally been a challenge to develop a domestic capital market infra-
structure with the vibrant euro capital markets on the doorstep. The close
integration and convergence with the EU has ironically also been a factor in
diminishing the urgency to develop a domestic capital market. This is in con-
trast with other emerging market countries in Asia and Latin America where
there has been a clear necessity to successfully develope local currency capital
markets.
Coming out of the crisis, policy makers – and international institutions such as
the EBRD – hence drew three broad lessons:
– first, financial integration has by and large been a success story and must be
preserved. Few would realistically consider a reversal of the foreign penetra-
tion of banking sectors, though I will outline a number of challenges to these
financial linkages and will outline how the industry and regulators could
respond;
– second, financial integration did provide a false sense of security and has
encouraged several countries to take unacceptable risks. We must find ways
to avoid the excesses of financial integration and to better manage the result-
ing liquidity and FX risks. Strengthened regulation on liquidity management
and consumer protection clearly has a role to play in stemming such risks
whilst the stock of existing bank FX loans will remain vulnerability for some
time to come;
– third, more balanced and reliable funding structures need to be established to
support the greater reliance on local currency lending and investment. Only
through the development of long-dated government, and corporate bond
markets and related FX and interest rate derivative instruments will the bank-
ing system be able to provide competitive local currency lending products.
There is a fair degree of consensus on these issues and no country is seriously
thinking about reversing financial integration although certain unilateral regula-
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tory measures could present a risk. At the same time, there is a widespread con-
sensus that unhedged foreign currency borrowing has been a source of both micro
and macro economic risk that must be mitigated and that a broader financial
market reform is required to create a more sustainable domestic local currency
financial market with an integrated EU market.
3.2. A SHIFTING REGULATORY CONTEXT
These efforts will need to proceed in what is easily the most uncertain regulatory
environment in over a decade. G-20 leaders last year clearly identified regulatory
shortcomings as one of the contributory factors of the financial crisis, and
through the Financial Stability Board have laid out a programme of reform. A key
element is the revision of the Basel standards for bank supervision, changes which
could be reflected in EU legislation as soon as 2012, and, one would expect, ulti-
mately in national legislation of countries outside the EU. This will have pro-
found implications for the way the banking industry operates, and strengthen
even further the case for developing long-dated local currency debt instruments.
Let me lay out a few key issues.
– first, it is generally acknowledged that the banking sector entered the crisis
with too much leverage. In response, the Basel committee has set out to
strengthen the quality of capital, for instance by excluding hybrid instruments
from the top tier types of capita. Also, minority participations in subsidiaries
may be excluded from tier one capital at the group level – a change that could
be problematic in CEE with its history of partial privatisations of banks. Also
a wider range of risks will be captured in the calculation of capital ratios.
Importantly this will include exposure in trading books, but could potentially
also affect inter-bank exposures, including from the bank parent to its subsid-
iary, which has been the key funding source in CEE;
– secondly, the vulnerability from a large share of funding in short term whole-
sale instruments has clearly been exposed in the crisis. In response, the Basel
committee proposes minimum standards on holding high-quality liquid assets
that could bridge a month’s disruption in funding markets; and, secondly, the
committee will stipulate standards on a certain share of stable long term fund-
ing. Again, this second element could be problematic in CEE where the long
term debt issuance capacity of banks is limited. This may constrain banks’
crucial role of maturity transformation;
– lastly, there are proposals to stem excessive swings in the credit cycle through
counter-cyclical capital requirements and forward-looking loan loss provi-
sions. We are still some way from a strong recovery in bank credit in the
emerging Europe region. But once credit does recover such ‘macro-pruden-
tial’ requirements could do much to temper emerging Europe’s traditional
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sharp swings in credit. That said, the correct calibration of provisioning
standards will be important as the lack of long term credit-loss data in the
CEE region could result in excessive provisioning.
Let me emphasize that the EU institutions, my colleagues at the EBRD, and
indeed the banking industry on the whole are supportive of the reforms proposed
by the Basel committee. A more resilient financial system will avoid the steep falls
in output, such as the one we just witnessed, and avoid the wide swings in credit
that have led to such wide mis-allocation of credit. But we have also pointed out
that the specific conditions of CEE, where bank finance is much more dominant,
need to be taken into account.
Let me also come back to the national initiatives within the EU that will inevitably
shape the industry. One aspect is the prudential measures that seek to restrain the
lending practices that ostensibly contributed to financial imbalances that were
exposed in the crisis. Another aspect is the bank levies and other taxes on finan-
cial transactions.
Two considerations apply: first, this is a closely integrated industry within which
credit provision could easily shift across the border within the EU, weakening
effective supervision that authorities seek to implement. Coordination within the
region, and ideally at the European level is critical. Secondly, we have ended up
with a bank-dominated financial system in emerging Europe, which may be the
result of inadequate capital market structures, limited investor bases, and uncer-
tainty over long term financial contracts. There may be scope to rebalance this
financial structure – indeed that is the central point of my speech today – though
this can not be fixed through taxing or worse, banning certain transactions that
are at the heart of the development of an efficient capital market such as FX and
interest rate derivatives. There are still deep gaps in market infrastructure and
regulation and these need to be tailored to the unique circumstances of the finan-
cial markets in CEE, as opposed to those in Western Europe and the US.
3.3. CAPITAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT: THE CURRENT 
PICTURE AND KEY PRIORITIES IN REFORM
What then are the current shortcomings in the domestic capital markets in CEE?
Let me illustrate with reference to bond markets. What we find in the new EU
members, is that these markets are almost entirely dominated by government
issuance. In some countries, notably in Poland and Hungary, there has been an
active policy to develop maturities and liquidity in the government bond market.
This has been possible due to the availability of long-term savings in the domestic
pension system, critical mass in government bond market and a macro economic
environment conducive to long term bond investment by both domestic and for-
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eign institutions. Other countries have had to resort to borrowing in foreign cur-
rency, most notably Euro, due to the lack of savings availability in the domestic
market or an unpredictable macro-economic environment, making the cost and
tenor of debt in local currency unattractive.
Ongoing issuance and liquid secondary market trading in government bonds is
normally a precondition for the development of a corporate bond market. But it
is by no means sufficient. The fact that this market segment has failed to develop
across CEE has a number of reasons. In spite of the EU financial market integra-
tion, regulatory requirements, issuance, listing, clearing and settlement costs and
procedures have continued to be more burdensome than in the Eurobond market,
especially in the smaller markets. In markets such as Poland nominal corporate
bond market capitalisation is relatively high, though issuance is concentrated
among only a handful of large enterprises and banks. Often issuance was done
through private placements, creating only limited secondary market liquidity. As
a result there is very little interest from the international capital market partici-
pants to arrange, invest or trade in the local corporate bond markets in CEE. Such
demand will need to be created domestically, and this will require a clear focus
on improving the efficiency and costs to levels that are at par with those in the
international capital market.
Commercial banks are typically important issuers in local bond markets. But
most banks in CEE have operated with unfettered access to external capital
mostly provided by their parents. As these have centralised liquidity management,
there has been little need to develop country specific funding bases. The expecta-
tion of early euro adoption further discouraged building up market infrastructure
that could be seen to be specific only to the local currency. This takes us into a
circular argument, as the dominance of bank finance appears to have been self-
perpetuating.
But given the changes in consumer and corporate behaviour and bank regulation
that I mentioned – and in particular the restraints on foreign currency retail lend-
ing imposed by prudential policy – the impetus is now there to develop domestic
debt capital markets. I would like to highlight some key technical issues that are
nevertheless critical hurdles that need to be overcome to enable the further devel-
opment of domestic local currency bond markets in CEE.
– in most emerging markets, where there are no developed interest rate hedging
instruments, this has resulted in the bond markets being limited to relatively
short maturities. For longer maturity bond markets to develop, there will
need to be a focus on both the development of a transparent and liquid sec-
ondary market and at the same time the development of an active interest rate
swap market. This will require the appropriate legal and regulatory reforms
but also the establishment of reliable money market indices such as LIBOR
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and EURIBOR. In several countries in CEE such as Poland and Hungary
these have been well established but in most of CEE this is still very much
lacking. Without the development of an active money and swap market it will
be very difficult to see a deepening of the local currency government and
corporate bond market;
– in most markets in the CEE region banks will continue to be the most impor-
tant investors in the government and corporate bond markets. Given the
objective of developing longer maturity bond markets regulators will need to
focus on raising the participation and growth of the insurance, pension and
asset management sectors. Regulation will need to accommodate the partici-
pation of these institutions in the corporate bond markets whose investments
for the time being are very much restricted to the government bond markets;
– in terms of long-term debt issuance by banks, it will be important to put in
place legislation to enable the development of a covered bond markets. This
is going to be a more stable source of long term finance, in contrast to both
unsecured bond issuance and funding through securitisation instruments;
– clearing and settlement and listing infrastructure needs to be such that both
government and corporate bond markets can be effectively used for repo
transactions with the central banks, as collateral to support derivative trans-
actions and to facilitate participation by foreign investors. This does require
the need to ensure inter-operability with the European clearing and settlement
systems even though this can often be a challenge in relation to a long-term
cost benefits analysis.
To summarise, there are huge advantages in operating under the securities market
regulation of the EU and the challenges faced are to a large extent within the
control of many of the countries in CEE. Clearly critical mass and macro eco-
nomic stability are preconditions, but the legal, regulatory and infrastructure
changes and investments needed to improve the efficiency of the bond and swap
market are largely in the hands of the national regulators and central banks.
What is often lacking is the political will to strike a balance between protecting
the local market traditions and infrastructure and reaping the benefits of market
efficiency that have been created through the single European market for finan-
cial services.
One sometimes hears the view that countries that are near to euro adoption can
not realistically develop local markets. I disagree with this view, and not just
because the path into the eurozone has become more uncertain in recent months.
The current crisis that has affected the euro zone has exposed a key vulnerability
of a currency union without coordinated fiscal policies. A common monetary
policy – too loose in some, and too tight in others – has created rapid divergence
in demand, and the ensuing private debt, in particular in southern Europe. The
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sustainability of these intra-European debt exposures will vex bond markets and
bank analysts for years to come. As Europe addresses this crisis it will be clear
that the strengthening of the domestic financial system, accompanied by tighter
fiscal surveillance will need to strike a balance between the advantages of the
integrated European financial market and the need to finance private and public
debt with domestic savings, whether or not a country is inside or still outside the
euro zone.
For this reason, eventual euro membership will not make efforts in domestic cap-
ital market development redundant. The home bias of local institutional investors
will continue to favour local issuance backed by local assets. This will apply not
only to government bond market but also to debt issued by banks and enterprises.
3.4. VISION: THRIVING ON BOTH LOCAL AND EU WIDE 
FINANCIAL MARKETS
The European economic environment will remain volatile over the coming years.
The recent crisis has reminded us of the dangers of exposing locally rooted bor-
rowers, such as households, to the international carry trade in currency risk. The
comfort of EU accession and prospect of euro adoption created a false sense of
security and created risks that could have been avoided.
Countries outside the euro will obviously persevere with the efforts in meeting the
convergence criteria, yet not take an imminent adoption for granted and take
risks that offer only modest short term benefit. Building market structures and
regulation that primarily cater to local currency instruments will pay rewards
whatever the entry path. Building long term funding capacity in local currencies
now is an integral part of our collective effort to make financial markets more
reliable providers of credit.
But even in a distant vision of most of Central and South-Eastern Europe within
not just the EU but also part of a common currency area we should still seek to
benefit from local capital markets that cater to niches of local issuers and to inves-
tors pre-disposed towards local assets. Some assets may lend themselves to
regional trading, in particular the equity markets. Others such as government
debt and that of first tier banks and corporates that can utilise the broader Euro-
pean market would also continue to benefit from a reliable source of finance from
their domestic investor base. It is this mix of local market development and Euro-
pean integration that will ultimately return finance in CEE to be the driver of
growth that it has been.
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4. WHAT HAS DRIVEN PRIVATE SECTOR CREDIT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN CENTRAL, EASTERN, AND 
SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE?
Markus Eller, Michael Frömmel, Nora Srzentic1,2
Abstract
This paper3 provides an analysis of the long- and short-run determinants of
domestic bank lending to the private sector in eleven Central, Eastern and South-
eastern European (CESEE) countries, exploring demand versus supply factors, the
existence of structural changes over time, the speed of adjustment of credit to
macroeconomic fundamentals, as well as differences between lending to house-
holds and lending to non-financial firms. We show a strong positive long-run
impact of economic activity and a largely negative impact of inflation on the level
of credit. Supply factors explain much of the variation in credit growth but their
impact differs across subperiods. Periods of bank restructuring or economic crises
trigger also adjustment in credit. Macro-prudential analysis should – in the assess-
ment of short-run credit developments – also focus on bank-related credit supply
factors and their changing impact over time. If and when credit does not adjust
by itself to levels which are in line with economic fundamentals, regulation might
be needed to make up for the absence of market self-correction. We also find that
before the Great Recession, country-specific factors were more important than
global factors for switches between different patterns of credit growth determina-
tion. However, the recent crisis had a considerable cross-regional impact, calling
also for a stronger cross-border coordination of regulatory measures.
4.1. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTION TO THE 
LITERATURE
Analyzing credit growth in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe (CESEE)
has become very prominent in the past few years, especially during the period of
rapid credit expansion that was observed in most countries of that region before
they were hit by the Great Recession in the latter part of 2008. The literature
1 Opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the official viewpoint of the Oesterreichische
Nationalbank nor the Eurosystem.
2 The authors thank Peter Backé, Ernest Gnan, Sylvia Kaufmann, Doris Ritzberger-Grünwald, Helmut Stix,
Zoltan Walko, Julia Wörz (all OeNB), two anonymous referees, and the participants of the SUERF/MNB
conference “The Future of Banking in CESEE after the Financial Crisis”, 23 June 2010, for their valuable
comments. Research for the paper mentioned in footnote 3 was largely conducted when Michael Frömmel was
visiting the OeNB’s Foreign Research Division as a guest researcher in July and August 2009. Financial support
by the Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek – Vlaanderen (Research Foundation Flanders) is gratefully acknowl-
edged.
3 An earlier and more comprehensive version of this paper has been published in the quarterly publication of the
Oesterreichische Nationalbank Focus on European Economic Integration, Q2/10, pp. 50-78, May 2010.
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primarily focused on potential excessiveness of credit growth: Can high pre-crisis
credit growth rates be attributed to convergence-related financial deepening or
more to an unsustainable culmination of credit beyond levels that would be jus-
tified by macroeconomic fundamentals (Boissay, Calvo-Gonzalez and Kozluk
2005; Backé, Égert and Zumer 2006 or Kiss, Nagy and Vonnák 2006)? In one of
the most recent corresponding papers, Zumer, Égert and Backé (2009) found that
in the first quarter in 2009 domestic private sector credit levels were rather high
in Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria and Croatia in comparison to underlying macroeco-
nomic fundamentals (to a somewhat lesser extent also in Lithuania and Hun-
gary), which indicates that private sector credit had possibly grown beyond the
equilibrium path in these countries. Policy challenges of and responses to lending
booms were widely discussed in Kraft and Jankov (2004) for Croatia, in Duen-
wald, Gueorguiev and Schaechter (2005) for Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine, or
in Backé, Égert and Walko (2007) for the whole European emerging market
region. Hilbers, Ötker-Robe and Pazarbasioglu (2007) elaborated how pruden-
tial and supervisory policies could be used in strengthening the resilience of the
financial system to adverse consequences of rapid credit expansion in CESEE.
Despite all this effort in the literature, several important questions have remained
open. Most of them require a more disaggregated approach. First, the evidence
for total domestic private sector credit needs not necessarily be the same for its
subcomponents as credit dynamics may differ depending on the respective target
group (household or firms). Second, credit determinants may differ in the long
run and in the short run. While in the long run demand-side factors are expected
to drive credit developments (financial deepening as response to raising incomes),
in the short run supply-side factors are presumed to be more decisive in determin-
ing credit growth dynamics. A higher degree of inertia for demand factors might
be one of the reasons for such a distinction. Third, the way credit growth has been
determined is quite likely subject to structural changes over time, such as business
cycle shocks or financial sector reforms, which have frequently occurred in the
CESEE region. Fourth, not only the distance to equilibrium credit levels4 matters,
but also the type of adjustment toward equilibrium might be subject to changes
over time. For instance, we could have a situation where ‘excessive’ credit levels
are corrected toward equilibrium levels only in particular subperiods, while mar-
ket self-correction is absent in other subperiods.
Accordingly, we developed in Eller, Frömmel and Srzentic (2010) a disaggregated
methodological framework that is able to account for sectoral and time-specific
differences in the determination of credit developments. Intuitively speaking, our
approach consists of three building blocks. First, we establish a long-run equilib-
rium relation between demand-side macroeconomic fundamentals and private
4 Behavioral definition of equilibrium, i.e. credit levels in line with underlying macroeconomic fundamentals.
SUERF2011_1.book  Page 42  Friday, March 11, 2011  9:54 AMWHAT HAS DRIVEN PRIVATE SECTOR CREDIT DEVELOPMENTS IN CESEE? 43
larcier
sector credit levels. This step is in line with the existing literature to compare
actual credit levels with equilibrium ones. We add here by distinguishing between
total domestic private sector credits, firm credits, and household credits. Second,
we explain short-run dynamics (credit growth) with both the change in bank-
related credit supply variables and the deviation of credit levels from underlying
fundamentals to check whether an equilibrium adjustment takes place in the case
of ‘excessive’ credit growth. This level-deviation is directly taken from the long-
term relation. Third – our main contribution – we examine whether the impact
of short-run determinants shows a nonlinear behavior over time, i.e. whether it
changes from one subperiod to the other. This enables us to check whether a
change in the way credit growth has been determined can be linked to macroeco-
nomic shocks or restructuring events and whether there are notable cross-country
differences. Respective knowledge could be important for targeted and timely
macro-financial stability assessments as well as for the appropriate redesign of the
post-crisis macroeconomic banking environment.
This paper proceeds as follows: section 4.2. provides descriptive statistics for the
evolution and structure of credit markets in our sample of eleven CESEE coun-
tries (CESEE-115) as from 1996. Section 4.3. describes the mentioned building
blocks of our model more in detail. Our results are shown in section 4.4., while
section 4.5. is a summary and derives some policy implications.
4.2. COMPOSITION AND EVOLUTION OF CREDIT STOCKS 
AND CREDIT GROWTH
This section describes our basic variable of interest – the evolution and composi-
tion of credit stocks and credit growth in the CESEE-11 since 1996 (which we
compare with the euro area). Basic data issues and a description of other variables
are covered in the appendix.
5 The ten CESEE countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 respectively and Croatia. Hereafter, CEE-5 refers
to the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia; SEE-3 to Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania; and
‘Baltic countries’ to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
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Chart 1: Stock and Growth Rate of Domestic Nonbank Private Sector Credit Compared 
with Cross-Border Credit, 1996 until first quarter of 2010
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Chart 1: Continued
Note: End-of-month credit stocks are presented as shares of nominal GDP (in local currency), whereby a
rolling 12-month GDP, which was previously linearly interpolated from quarterly to monthly frequency, is
used. The (real) growth rate of domestic private credit is calculated as the year-on-year percentage change,
deflated by the CPI-based inflation rate. Cross-border credits are approximated by external debt of the non-
bank private sector, excluding intercompany loans and trade credits (liabilities). They were only available on
a quarterly basis (not available at all for the euro area) and thus we interpolated the end-of-quarter stocks
linearly to monthly frequency (this type of interpolation should be straightforward as credit stocks evolve
quite moderately over time). The shadowed areas indicate subperiods with a different type of credit growth
determination than in the rest of the sample (delivered by the MS-ECM model in Eller, Frömmel, and Srzen-
tic, 2010).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF (1996), national central banks (1997-2003), and the ECB (2004
onwards).
Chart 1 depicts, for each country, domestic private sector credit stocks and cross-
border credit stocks as a percentage of GDP. Whenever disaggregate information
was available, be it for the whole observation period or for particular subperiods,
we distinguished domestic private credit by households and by firms. Moreover,
we also show the year-on-year real growth rate of domestic private credit (black
line). Shadowed areas in Chart 1 are explained later in more detail – they basically
indicate subperiods with a different type of credit growth determination than in
the rest of the sample.
After some disruptions due to country-specific crises in the 1990s, most
CESEE-11 countries experienced a strong and smooth expansion of private sector
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loans until late 2007/early 2008. Nevertheless, as a result of the Great Recession,
credit growth rates decelerated sharply, and currently (first quarter of 2010) we
observe in all of these countries even negative or zero year-on-year changes of
domestic private credit, most strongly pronounced in Hungary (-14% in April
2010) followed by the Baltic countries (about -7%) and Romania (about -4%).
In terms of the evolution of domestic private sector credit over time, we can
distinguish three groups of countries. First, the Czech Republic and Slovakia
already disposed of considerably high credit stocks in the mid-1990s (around
60% of GDP). However, credit stocks shrank remarkably as a consequence of
bank restructuring in the late 1990s and early 2000s. As a case in point, Slovakia
recorded a real average change of -20% in 2001 and the Czech Republic -28%
in 2002. Credit stocks have still not reached the degree of financial intermedia-
tion observed earlier (the high values registered in the Czech Republic and Slo-
vakia in the mid- and late 1990s have to be interpreted with caution as they were
‘inflated’ by a comparatively high share of nonperforming loans; see Eller and
Haiss, 2003). Second, Poland and Hungary were characterized by real credit
growth rates of more than 20% already in the late 1990s but have experienced
a comparatively moderate and steady expansion of credit since then. Third, Slov-
enia, Bulgaria, Romania, and especially the Baltic countries went through a brisk
increase of credit stocks as a percentage of GDP starting by 2000–2003. From
January 2003 until December 2007, the average (year-on-year) real credit
growth rate was 19% in Slovenia, 28% in Estonia, 35% in Bulgaria, 38% in
Romania, 40% in Latvia, and 44% in Lithuania. Croatia is a special case, where
the expansion of domestic credit was comparable with Hungary or the Czech
Republic (at least since 2003), but at the same time the share of cross-border
credits increased strongly and reached more than 40% of GDP in December
2008. In the CESEE-11, this is by far the highest share of cross-border credits,
followed by 30% in Bulgaria and around 22% in Estonia and Latvia. Given
these different patterns of financial development, we can also expect that there
are considerable differences in the way credit growth has been determined across
countries.
Besides the overall expansion of domestic private sector credit, the share of
household credit increased considerably over time in all the CESEE-11 countries
(especially in the Baltic countries and Croatia). The bulk of new lending is attrib-
utable to loans for house purchases, which already account for more than 50%
of total household loans in most of the CESEE-11 (ranging from 26% in Roma-
nia to about 80% in the Baltic countries).
Even though the degree of financial intermediation has been on the rise over the
last decade, there is still a considerable catching-up potential vis-à-vis the euro
area. The latter’s share of domestic private sector credit in GDP lies at 145% (see
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the last panel of Chart 1). Only Estonia and Latvia6 have reached a respective
share of a little more than 100%, while on the other end, Romania (40%) and
Slovakia (48%) clearly lag behind.
4.3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
As mentioned in Section 4.1., we use an analytical approach that consists of three
building blocks for which we provide now more details (for a full formal descrip-
tion, see Eller, Frömmel and Srzentic, 2010).
4.3.1. Long-run Demand-oriented Equilibrium Relation
We establish a long-run equilibrium relation between private sector credit levels
and demand-side macroeconomic fundamentals by using a credit demand equa-
tion as the long-term relation, which is common in the empirical literature (Pazar-
basioglu, 1997; Ghosh and Ghosh, 1999; Barajas and Steiner, 2002; Calza,
Gartner and Sousa, 2003).
In the benchmark version of our model, the variation in claims on resident non-
bank private sector (total, firms, households) is explained by the variation in
three variables: (1) industrial production as the best-available proxy for economic
activity at monthly frequency (to get as much statistical power as possible we
work with monthly data), (2) the nominal lending rate on short-term loans to the
private nonbank sector, and (3) the HICP-based year-on-year inflation rate (for
details on the data, see the appendix).
One may expect the following responses of credit to these variables: Higher eco-
nomic activity typically results in more transactions that have to be financed by
credit and therefore the demand for loans expands. A higher lending rate, in turn,
is expected to reduce the demand for credit, as the nominal costs of loans (at least
their observable component) increase. The expected impact of inflation is not that
clear-cut. While higher inflation decreases the real costs of loans, associated with
higher credit demand, there are also arguments for a negative correlation of infla-
tion and credit (see Kiss, Nagy and Vonnák, 2006). First, once inflation has
exceeded a certain threshold, it is associated with greater inflation volatility and
higher uncertainty of economic agents who postpone investments and thus reduce
credit demand. Second, if nominal rates are high – even if the real interest rate is
low – private agents can primarily get loans with shorter duration, which, in turn,
limits the maximum lending volume (inflation indexation of loans is pretty
unpopular in CESEE).
6 However, if we also include cross-border credits, the share of total private sector credit lies clearly above 100%
of GDP also in Bulgaria, Croatia, and Slovenia.
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In Eller, Frömmel and Srzentic (2010) we also checked alternative specifications
for the long-run equilibrium relation. For instance, we added cross-border credits
to the total domestic private sector credit stock since they account for a substan-
tial share of total credit volume in some of the CESEE-11 (especially in Croatia
and Bulgaria, but also in Estonia and Latvia; see the previous section). We addi-
tionally included a financial sector reform proxy (based on the EBRD transition
indicator for banking reform and interest rate liberalization) to account for long-
run structural conditions that have most likely determined the evolution of credit
volumes over time. We also employed different interest rate specifications (real
instead of nominal, also longer-term maturities) and included government credit
to account for a potential crowding-out of private sector credits by public one.
The benchmark results (to be presented in the next section) remain largely unaf-
fected by these refinements (i.e. we do not observe any considerable change in the
size or the sign of the estimated coefficients in the long-run equilibrium relation).
4.3.2. Short-run Supply-oriented Credit Growth Relation
If there exists an equilibrium relationship between credit volume and the level of
macroeconomic fundamentals (i.e., in econometric terms, there is a cointegration
relation), the unexplained component of credit stock variation (the residuals from
the long-term relation) describes the distance to the equilibrium credit levels,
whereby this component widens if credit stocks depart from the underlying fun-
damentals. In the context of a so-called error correction specification, we can
check how credit growth reacts to such a deviation. Suppose that credit growth
responds negatively to an increasing distance between actual credit levels and
equilibrium credit levels – this would imply that ‘overshooting’ credit positions
are corrected downward. We implement this error correction mechanism in the
short-term relation and regress credit growth on (1) the residuals from the long-
term relation, (2) lagged credit growth to account for potential inertia in the
credit dynamics7, and (3) a set of short-run supply-oriented explanatory variables
that consist of following groups:
The source of funds available for lending forms the first group. We follow here a
bank balance sheet decomposition approach and argue that claims on the left-
hand side of a bank balance are funded by deposits and equity from the right-
hand side of the balance. The banks’ net external position (external assets minus
external liabilities) covers foreign funds as an additional source for the supply of
domestic loans. Also, this position comprises net foreign assets as a substitute for
lending to domestic customers (hence, net foreign assets may be driven by
7 Note that we do not include lagged differences of the explanatory variables of the long-term relation as we
presume their impact to be mainly a long-run demand-side one. Moreover, residual graphs do not really hint at
missing lagged variables.
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demand or by supply; see Frömmel and Karagyozova, 2008). Thus, while for
deposits and equity we can expect a positive impact on credit growth, the con-
crete sign for the banks’ net external position is ambiguous ex ante.
Second, we include the interest spread between lending and deposit rates to
account for the effects of banking competition on credit growth. Signaling prof-
itability, a considerable positive spread acts as an incentive for new banks to enter
the market. Lending can be expected to accelerate owing to such new entrants.
At the same time, competition among banks increases, which results in a narrow-
ing spread. At that point, the question arises whether – at the lower end of the
spread – banks still increase lending in pursuit of market share or rather scale
back lending (in which case a positive sign can be expected for this variable).
Third and finally, we include industrial production in the euro area to cover
potential spillovers from higher economic activity in important CESEE trading
partner and parent bank countries. Moreover, we include also the exchange rate
volatility of the local currency vis-à-vis the euro, as the share of euro-denomi-
nated loans to the nonbank private sector is relatively high in a number of CESEE
countries8. Higher exchange rate volatility is expected to increase exchange rate
risks and to reduce credit supply.
4.3.3. Time-varying Determination of Credit Growth
So far we have assumed that the way credit growth has been determined in the
short-term relation is time-invariant. However, in the observation period the
CESEE countries have been confronted with several structural changes that might
have resulted in a changing impact of short-run credit determinants over time
(such as financial sector restructuring, privatization waves, or business cycle
shocks). For instance, it is of interest whether we can distinguish episodes with
adjustment toward the credit equilibrium (stable subperiod) from episodes where
a departure of credit from the underlying macroeconomic fundamentals is not
corrected (unstable subperiod).
There are also theoretical models that observe switches between different equi-
libria in the credit market (e.g., Scheinkman and Weiss 1986 or Azariadis and
Smith 1998; the latter is based on constraints in borrowing and asymmetric infor-
mation and leads to transitions between a Walrasian subperiod and a subperiod
of credit rationing with slowing economic activity, falling interest rates and bind-
ing credit constraints).
To account for subperiod-specific particularities in the examined relationships
and to provide an empirical investigation for the mentioned theoretical credit
8 Notable exceptions are Hungary and Poland, where the Swiss franc predominates foreign currency loans to
households.
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market models, we applied in Eller, Frömmel and Srzentic (2010) a so-called
Markov-switching error correction model (MS-ECM) that identifies endog-
enously from the sample data9 at most two subperiods10 with a different impact
of credit growth determinants and/or different adjustment of credit towards equi-
librium levels. The shadowed area in Chart 1 marks one of the two subperiods,
while the other subperiod corresponds to the rest of the sample.
Of course, one could also think of using alternative empirical approaches, e.g. by
allowing for time-variability in the long-term relation or by introducing a time
trend into the long-term relation that captures the deepening of the financial mar-
ket. The first approach could be justified by financial sector reforms that resulted
in new equilibria, which could also be captured by including dummy variables (we
accounted for this in a robustness check). In contrast, a time trend would represent
a more gradual evolution of the financial sector. However, the residuals of the
long-term relation do not give any reason to include a time trend in the model.
4.4. RESULTS
When estimating the credit demand equation, we find at least one long-run equi-
librium relation between credit volume and macroeconomic fundamentals in all
cases except for specific credit aggregates in Slovakia, Hungary and Croatia (see
Eller, Frömmel and Srzentic 2010). Chart 2 shows the strength of the impact of
the three long-run credit determinants on different private sector credit aggre-
gates. Economic activity, proxied by industrial production, has by far the strong-
est effect across the CESEE-11 and the positive impact is clearly more pro-
nounced for household credits than for firm credits. However, an ‘income elastic-
ity’ of above one could probably reflect the omission of other important variables
such as wealth or non-GDP transactions (financial transactions, housing pur-
chases) which may also be relevant to explain credit demand (see Calza et al.,
2006). Consequently – as described before in Section 4.3.1. – we also included
additional variables in a series of robustness checks; the marginal effect of eco-
nomic activity decreases somewhat but still remains clearly positive.
As in Kiss, Nagy and Vonnák (2006) or Backé, Égert and Zumer (2006), inflation
shows mostly a negative correlation with lending, supporting more the view that
economic uncertainty associated with higher inflation reduces the demand for
credit. The lending rate does not show the expected negative sign in most of the
9 It is therefore not necessary to make a priori assumptions about the exact occurrence of a switch but, obviously,
drastic changes in the pattern of credit growth, such as in the most recent crisis situation, increase the proba-
bility for a change in the way credit growth has been determined.
10 The MS-ECM could also be extended to a model with more than two sub-periods. However, the model then
becomes highly nonlinear, which causes problems for the estimation (in our case quasi-maximum likelihood).
Furthermore, models with more than two regimes do not necessarily perform much better (see Gallo and Rossi,
2006).
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countries. Its marginal effect is mostly centered around zero and in some cases
even counterintuitively positive. A positive impact of the lending rate is, however,
in line with existing empirical evidence such as Backé, Égert and Zumer, 2006,
for Southeastern European transition and non-European emerging market econ-
omies or Boissay, Calvo-Gonzalez and Koźluk, 2005 for some of the CESEE
countries. This evidence remains unchanged when we use different interest rate
measures (longer maturities, a real instead of a nominal rate).
Chart 2: Long-run Evolution of Credit Aggregates: Marginal Effects Across the 
CESEE-11 for Each Private Sector Credit Aggregate
Strong positive impact of economic activity…
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…and a largely negative impact of inflation
Note: The marginal effects shown in this chart stem from country-specific OLS regressions of (logarithmic)
credit levels on the (logarithmic) level of industrial production, the lending rate and the inflation rate. Cover-
age: CESEE-11, 1997m1-2009m4. If the estimated marginal effect was statistically insignificant at the 5%
level, it enters with a zero here.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eller, Frömmel and Srzentic (2010).
We proceed by examining the short-run determinants of credit growth, using a set
of bank-related credit supply variables, lagged credit growth and the residuals
from the long-term relation (for a detailed presentation of these results see Eller,
Frömmel and Srzentic 2010). The estimated coefficient on the residuals indicates
that there is an adjustment toward equilibrium credit levels in most countries in
the long run (i.e. for the whole sample period where we do not allow for time-
varying coefficients). However, there are also a few countries (such as the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Croatia) where the coefficient indicates either
a very sluggish equilibrium adjustment (that can be explained with frictions and
transaction costs in the credit market; see Calza, Manrique and Sousa (2006) for
respective euro area evidence) or a constant and persistent deviation from the
equilibrium credit levels.
The sources of funds available for lending (bank deposits and equity) turn out to
be the most important short-run drivers of credit growth. They have typically a
sizeable positive impact; for instance, in Poland a 1% increase of bank deposit
growth is associated with an increase of total domestic private sector credit
growth by 0.67%. Changes in the net external position provide – in line with its
theoretical inconclusiveness discussed before – low explanatory power, although
there is mostly a negative relation with credit growth (less pronounced in the
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bles (interest rate spread, exchange rate volatility, output in the euro area and
lagged credit growth) do not show a clear pattern. For the Baltic countries there
seems to be some evidence for a positive relation with output in the euro area. A
positive relation with lagged credit growth can be unambiguously detected only
for some credit aggregates in the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Baltic countries
and Romania.
In a third step we present the results for the time-varying short-run credit growth
relation, basing on the aforementioned MS-ECM methodology. Equity and
deposit growth remain the most important explanatory variables of total private
sector credit growth (for a detailed presentation see again Eller, Frömmel and
Srzentic 2010). However, in most of the countries their impact differs signifi-
cantly across the identified subperiods, showing that the main short-run determi-
nants of credit growth do not have the same (i.e. linear) impact over the whole
sample period. According to Chart 1, that distinguishes subperiods of different
credit growth determination by shadowed areas, we can divide the countries into
two groups: While the first group shows clear and long-lasting subperiod-
switches (Poland, the Czech Republic, the Baltic countries and Bulgaria), the sec-
ond group mainly stays in one subperiod with only short switches (Croatia,
Romania and Slovenia, to a lesser extent Hungary and Slovakia). For the first
group of countries, we find at least one episode in which bank equity and/or
deposits show a very pronounced positive impact on credit growth. However, the
dates of observed switches vary from country to country and show no common
pattern, which indicates that the switches are likely to be due to country-specific
rather than global determinants. Nevertheless, just before and during the Great
Recession, all countries in this group except for the Czech Republic show a
switch. This shift, which occurs between early 2007 (Poland) and late 2008
(Lithuania), invariably shows a weakened relation between credit growth on the
one hand and bank equity or deposit growth on the other hand (not the case in
Bulgaria where deposit growth has a stronger effect on credit growth during the
subperiod that comprises the Great Recession).
One might be interested in the factors that were responsible for a shift in the type
of credit growth determination. Natural candidates are incisive business cycle
fluctuations or financial sector reforms. For the three Baltic countries and the
Czech Republic we can observe that one of the detected subperiods represents a
boom period with high GDP growth and credit growth, while the other subperiod
represents more of a crisis period with relatively poor economic performance,
higher economic volatility and relatively low – if not negative – credit growth. In
the other countries, the differences across subperiods appear to be less correlated
with the business cycle. In Slovakia and Bulgaria, for instance, we can link the
switches more to periods of financial sector restructuring. To illustrate these sub-
period-specific characteristics, we present in Chart 3 the estimated coefficients for
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the credit growth relation for three selected countries, both for the whole sample
as well as for the two detected subperiods.
First, Slovakia is an example of a country where we cannot learn much from the
time-invariant model (reflected by zero coefficients for the whole observation
period), while the time-variant model reveals a different impact of credit growth
determinants in particular subperiods. The short-lived subperiod 1 (2001-2002)
coincides with a period of bank restructuring that was characterized by bank
recapitalizations and a transfer of nonperforming loans to a state-owned consol-
idation bank (see OeNB, 2001, pp. 78ff.). In contrast to the rest of the sample,
credit positions are corrected toward equilibrium in this subperiod (indicated by
the negative coefficient for the error correction term). The bank recapitalizations
had apparently a positive impact on credit growth in subperiod 1 (strong negative
coefficient for equity growth), whereas in the rest of the sample there is clear
evidence that an increase in both equity and deposit growth had a positive impact
on credit growth.
Second, Lithuania is an example for a country where the two subperiods are
broadly correlated with ups and downs of the business cycle: during downturns
such as restructuring after the Russian financial crisis 1998 or in the context of
the more recent crisis situation (subperiod 1) credit corrects toward the equilib-
rium, while there was no equilibrium correction during the rest of the sample
(subperiod 2). Interestingly, a positive impact of equity and deposit growth on
credit growth can only be detected for the boom years, while during downturns
the short-run supply determinants had basically no direct impact on credit
growth in Lithuania.
Third, Bulgaria is an example for a country that experienced on the one hand
post-crisis financial sector restructuring at the end of the 1990s (after the reces-
sion in 1996 and 1997) and on the other hand a series of administrative measures
to rein in rapid credit growth in the mid 2000s. Both of these periods of active
policy measures were characterized by tightened capital adequacy and/or mini-
mum reserve requirements and are captured in our model by subperiod 1 (1999-
2001 and 2004-2006). Although the coefficient for the error correction term is
slightly bigger in subperiod 1 than in the rest of the sample, we cannot conclude
that the correction toward the credit equilibrium is stronger in subperiod 1 as the
difference between the two subperiods is statistically not significant. However,
only for subperiod 1 we can observe a negative impact of equity growth (likely
due to the stricter capital adequacy requirements), a less strong positive effect of
deposit growth than in the rest of the sample, and a positive effect of economic
activity in the euro area (capturing the so-called foreign parent bank channel,
whereby especially the restructuring period in the late 1990s was accompanied by
large-scale privatization of banks and a strong inflow of foreign direct invest-
ments in the financial sector).
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Chart 3: Subperiod-specific Impact of Credit Growth Determinants in Selected CESEE 
Countries
Note: The marginal effects shown in this chart stem from country-specific OLS regressions of domestic pri-
vate sector credit growth on the variables listed at the horizontal axis. The error correction term is the resid-
ual of the long-run equilibrium regression. Coverage: CESEE-11, 1997m1-2009m4. If the estimated
marginal effect was statistically insignificant at the 5% level, it enters with a zero here. *** indicates a signif-
icant difference of coefficients across the identified subperiods.































Subperiod 1: bank restructuring (2001-2002)
Subperiod 2: rest of the sample
Slovakia
d(total domestic private sector credit growth)  /  d(explanatory variable)

































Subperiod 1: "economic crisis periods"
Subperiod 2: rest of the sample
Lithuania





























Subperiod 1: restructuring, admin. measures 
Subperiod 2: rest of the sample
Bulgaria
d(total domestic private sector credit growth) / d(explanatory variable)
*** ** *** 
SUERF2011_1.book  Page 55  Friday, March 11, 2011  9:54 AM56 THE FUTURE OF BANKING IN CESEE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
larcier
4.5. SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This paper applies a disaggregated approach to get a more profound knowledge
on the determinants of domestic private sector credit developments in eleven
CESEE countries, namely the CESEE EU Member States and Croatia, from Jan-
uary 1997 to April 2009. We distinguish between lending to firms and lending to
households, between short-run supply-side and long-run demand-side determi-
nants and identified subperiods with a different impact of credit growth determi-
nants. The main results and related policy implications can be summarized as
follows:
First, there is at least one long-run equilibrium relation between private sector
credit levels and demand-side macroeconomic fundamentals in most CESEE
countries, whereby economic activity is the most important long-run macroeco-
nomic determinant of credit levels; its positive impact is more pronounced for
household than for firm credits. Inflation shows a negative relation to lending for
most countries, whereas the lending rate displays in some cases a counter-intui-
tively positive sign, which, however, corroborates existing empirical evidence.
This evidence informs us also about the importance of demand-side macroeco-
nomic variables for the development of the financial sector in the long run – an
information that could also be of relevance for the long-run economic growth
perspectives of the examined CESEE countries as Rajan and Zingales (1998)
showed that more developed financial systems tend to record stronger growth
than less developed systems.
Second, bank-related credit supply variables (bank deposits and equity) explain
much of the variation in credit growth rates; yet, both the magnitude and direc-
tion of their impact differ substantially across the identified subperiods. This find-
ing is important for macro-prudential analysis as it should – in the assessment of
short-run credit developments and credit risk – focus also on bank-related credit
supply variables and their apparently changing impact over time.
Third, for a few countries there is a lack of continuous adjustment of actual credit
levels toward equilibrium credit levels (i.e. those that are implied by underlying
macroeconomic fundamentals). The time-varying model reveals that adjustment
takes, however, place in particular subperiods and coincides in some countries
with episodes of bank restructuring and/or economic crisis. If in particular sub-
periods actual credit levels departed from underlying macroeconomic fundamen-
tals and equilibrium correction did not materialize, regulatory measures would be
an important means to substitute for the absent self-correction of markets and to
promote a development in line with equilibrium credit levels. In this context, it is
expedient to consider business cycle positions (in particular whether credit devel-
opments fuel overheating) and to monitor how the adjustment toward equilib-
rium changes over time in order to implement policy measures timely.
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Fourth and finally, the countries under review showed until the outbreak of the
Great Recession a rather country-specific pattern for switches between subperi-
ods with a different impact of credit growth determinants, while in 2007-2008
most countries were equally confronted with a crisis-related shift that pushed the
way credit growth was determined back to a pattern that had already been
observed earlier (in most cases, before the economic boom period from 2000 to
2007) and that is characterized in most countries by a weaker relation of deposit
and credit growth. Thus, while in general country-specific factors were responsi-
ble for switches between different patterns of credit growth determination, we
can argue that the Great Recession has had a clear cross-regional impact and
hence global determinants mattered more for explaining the variation in credit
growth at the end of the sample. This calls for a closer international coordination
in the area of regulatory measures which is in fact needed also because of the
substantial share of cross-border credits in some CESEE countries.
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APPENDIX: DATA ISSUES AND DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
For our analysis we use data with monthly frequency (from January 1997 to April
2009) that are real-valued, seasonally adjusted and denominated in local cur-
rency. Those variables that are only available in nominal terms are deflated by
using the all-items HICP index (2005=100). All series are seasonally detrended by
applying the Census X12 method (also used by Eurostat to de-seasonalize EU
series). Table A1 provides detailed definitions and sources of the variables used in
the analysis.
Table A.1: Description of Variables
Variables Description Source
1) Credit variables
Total domestic private sector 
credits
Credit to resident non-monetary financial institutions (MFIs) 
excluding the general government in local currency (LC) mn, 
end-of-period (eop)
IMF (1993-1996), NCB 
(1997-2003) ECB (2004 
onwards)
Domestic firm credits Domestic credit to resident enterprises (non-financial 
corporations and other financial intermediaries) in LC mn, eop
“
Domestic household credits Domestic credit to resident households and non-profit 
institutions serving households in LC mn, eop
“
Cross-border credits to the 
private sector 
Calculated as external debt of the non-bank private sector, 
excluding intercompany loans and trade credits (liabilities); in 
EUR mn, eop (conversion to LC mn using the eop exchange 
rate). Available only on a quarterly basis, and thus we 
interpolated them linearly to monthly frequency
NCB and IMF (International 
Investment Position)
2) Long-run (demand-side) determinants
Industrial production (IP) Real industrial production (excl. construction), gross volume 
index (wiiw). For the Baltic countries and the euro area (IP_EA) 
we use working day adjusted data from Eurostat
wiiw, Eurostat
Lending rate (LR) Weighted average rate charged by non-MFIs on short-term 
loans to the private non-financial sector. The counterparties, 
maturites and weightings vary slightly from country to country
IMF International Financial 
Statistics (Datastream) 
Inflation rate (TTCPI) Year-on-year percentage change of the all-items HICP (index, 
2005=100)
Eurostat
3) Short-run (supply-side) determinants
Bank equity (equity) Banks’ capital and reserves in LC mn, eop IMF (1993-1996), NCB 
(1997-2003), ECB (2004 
onwards)
Domestic bank deposits of 
households and firms (depos)
Deposits of residents excluding the general government in LC 
mn, eop. For Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, and Slovakia 
we used deposits of resident non-MFIs excluding the central 
government (longer time series available)
“
Banks’ net external position 
(extpos)
External assets minus external liabilities, LC mn, eop “
Lending-deposit rate (spread) Spread between lending rate (see before) and deposit rate 
(weighted average rate offered by non-MFIs on deposits of the 
private non-financial sector), in percentage points
IMF International Financial 
Statistics (Datastream)
Exchange rate volatility 
(er_vola)
Percentage monthly variation of daily nominal exchange rates 
from their monthly mean, as measured by the coefficient of 
variation
WM / Reuters (Datastream)
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5. THE PROSPECTS FOR THE BANKING MARKET 
IN CESEE BEYOND THE CRISIS
Debora Revoltella and Fabio Mucci1
5.1. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the global crisis the economic environment in Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE) is now slowly showing signs of recovery. The growth out-
look varies significantly, with some countries recovering faster and some others
being still vulnerable to the market turbulences. While risks remain, these are
times for long term potential re-assessments and the CEE region confirms its posi-
tion as an appealing market.
The economic convergence process between CEE and Western Europe is still
ongoing, though at a lower pace and with a rebalanced economic model. In the
past, growth was fuelled by strong consumption and investment financed from
abroad, which contributed to the build up of large external unbalances. Such a
growth model continues to hold as a driver for convergence, however CEE coun-
tries should pursue it more cautiously emphasising the development of domestic
markets, sound regulation and diversification. In the longer term, potential
growth will remain below the pre-crisis, as all the drivers of convergence stay but
are less strong than in the past.
A rebalancing macroeconomic model implies a changing banking model. Banks
in CEE held up relatively better than other emerging market banks in previous
crises, but the various banking sector emerged from the crisis not unscathed. The
economic crisis reflected in a liquidity crunch first, followed by mounting credit
quality problems and a complete collapse in demand for lending. The support of
the parent-companies of the local banks has been essential. Banks had always
access to capital and funding in order to face the crisis. Today’s strategies have
been focusing on strong campaigns for deposits’ gathering, to secure a stable
funding base, as well as re-assessment of prudential standards. Ambitious pro-
grams to increase efficiency have been also launched all over the region, to com-
pensate for lower profitability of the business. The first half of 2010 unveiled
some stabilisation in the dynamic of problematic assets reinforcing signs that the
peak in terms of non performing loans might be reached between end of this year
and beginning of 2011 with some differentiation among countries. At the current
1 The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of UniCredit
Group.
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stage, recovery from the demand side is essential before seeing acceleration in
lending activity. 2010 is thus materialising as equally challenging as 2009 in terms
of banking profitability, as lower provisioning requirements are matched to a
lower revenues generation capacity, due to delays in economic recovery. Recovery
will start strengthening only in 2011, tough trends vary among countries substan-
tially.
In the medium to long term perspective, banking in CEE still holds opportunities,
but a number of market conditions differ after the crisis. Return to business
requires time and a rebalancing of the banking model. In the past, banks have
focused on the advantages of cheap external funding to finance lending growth,
particularly in FX and on the retail side. Now, there is a need for a more balanced
model, including stronger focus on domestic funding (although access to external
funding remains a competitive advantage), less focus on the retail and FX busi-
ness, strong control of costs and effective management of the higher than pre-
crisis cost of risk.
Hand in hand with changes in the competitive landscape in global banking, the
tougher post-crisis banking environment in CEE might drive further changes,
with opportunities for some repositioning and new comers in specific markets. In
that context, the possibility to leverage on a solid funding base and capital posi-
tion, good access to international markets and a specialised business model, other
than a good positioning will become more and more key competitive factors for
the CEE banks. Challenges ahead for the banking sector in the region include the
growing national regulatory pressures, with moves which are often un-coordi-
nated among countries, as well as Basel III implementation.
The paper is structured as followed – after this introduction, part 2 highlights the
impact of the crisis in CEE and the needed changes in the macroeconomic model
after the crisis. Part 3 discusses the impact of the crisis in CEE banking and the
ongoing reshaping in banking, also highlighting forthcoming regulatory chal-
lenges. Part 4 concludes.
5.2. THE CRISIS IN CEE AND THE REBALANCING OF THE 
MACROECONOMIC MODEL OUT OF THE CRISIS
One of the worst-hit regions last year at the height of the global financial crisis,
is trying to recover ground, after a downturn that saw the Baltic States and
Ukraine contract 16 and 15 percent, respectively and others shrink in the high
single digit area. Out from the crisis the strong effort is towards the building up
of a more balanced macroeconomic model, still preserving the upside potential
related to the convergence story.
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The world financial and economic crisis which erupted in full after the collapse
of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 temporarily interrupted the fast catching-
up process which characterised the CEE region in the previous decades. Freezing
global credit markets and capital flows early last year were associated with
mounting fears among investors about a systemic crisis involving both the CEE
region and the euro zone banking system. Following a decade of dynamic growth,
capital inflows towards the region came to a sudden stop in the fall of 2008
driving, in tandem with worsening international and internal macroeconomic
conditions, a sharp drop in output. In general, the need of an adjustment has been
more pressing in countries that previously experienced the biggest increase in
domestic demand, the largest external unbalances and the highest increase in pri-
vate sector indebtedness. Indeed, the economic health of countries across the
region was more varied than many investors and experts realised. Poland, for
example, was never in much danger, being the only EU country to record positive
GDP growth in 2009. Other Central European economies such as the Czech
Republic and Slovakia also managed the crisis relatively well despite the down-
turn experienced on the back of marked contraction in demand from neighbour-
ing Western European markets. More structurally unbalanced countries, like
South East European ones, the Baltics or Ukraine, have been suffering more,
requiring longer time to readjust and recover.
The international commitment has been essential in order to avoid a fully-fledged
regional crisis. The Group of 20 summit in London in April 2009 ensured the
International Monetary Fund had enough funds to provide assistance to countries
with financing difficulties. At the same time, also the role of international banks
active in the CEE region has been crucial. As strategic investors, they remained
commitment to the region. Their pro-active approach in the discussion with inter-
national and local regulators has contributed to reverse the negative mood and
loss of confidence which dominated financial markets in the aftermath of Lehman
collapse. In that context, the so called ‘Vienna Initiative’ represented a unique
chance to bring together banks, local regulators and international financial insti-
tutions. The series of meetings held in Vienna produced agreements on the shar-
ing of information and collective effort to restore stability. They have also
brought about signed commitments in particular countries, with leading interna-
tional banks subscribing to certain levels of refinancing and recapitalization of
their local subsidiaries and individual governments promising to implement cer-
tain policies. Commitments were signed for Serbia, Romania, Hungary and Bos-
nia Herzegovina, the 4 countries which tapped the IMF/EU support. A similar
agreement has been signed also for the Baltics.
The world recovery had a strong start in 2010 with upside surprises also in the
CEE region. Central European countries have been showing positive growth, as
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demand for exports has been growing, while South Eastern Europe still needs
time to re-adjust.
However, new headwinds emerged in April-May when European markets were
thrown into turmoil by mounting concerns over several euro zone countries’
capacity to finance their large deficits and growing public debt burdens. While the
CEE region’s financial markets initially resisted the pessimism spreading from the
euro debt crisis, the pressure later became more intense backed by fears that esca-
lating euro debt problems would create instability also for the region. In doing
that, financial markets have focused on possible spill-over effects mainly through
the traditional contagion channels (trade, banking exposure) with SEE countries
(particularly Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia) having been considered more vulner-
able given the strong presence of Greek banks in these markets. As a result, sov-
ereign credit spreads, which experienced a sensible reduction following the peak
recorded in March 2009, widened again and all asset classes were under strong
selling pressures. The large IMF/EU emergency funding facility approved in May
to Greece helped to mitigate potential short-term liquidity problems in the euro
area, but the risk of contagion to Central and Eastern Europe is still considered a
key issue to monitor for financial markets, even if fiscal mismanagement is not an
issue in these countries and the region generally looks far better than Western
Europe in terms of public sector debt (only Hungary is above the EU average).
CEE sovereign risk spreads’ varying performances during the Greek crisis also
implies investors are now taking a differentiated approach and the region is not
anymore considered as a homogeneous one. Countries such as Turkey and Poland
look more attractive because of their economic resilience and large domestic mar-
ket, and thus experienced a sensible downward correction in their sovereign
credit spreads relative to the peak of the crisis. Also in the front rank, are the
Czech Republic and Slovakia thanks to manufacturing strength and attractive-
ness for foreign direct investment. Hungary and SEE countries are instead lagging
behind, particularly Romania and Bulgaria, as they are seen overly reliant on
cheap credit before the crisis and expected to face still challenging prospects in
the mid term.
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CEE Country Risk Premium
5Y USD CDS Variations
Source: Bloomberg.
Overall, the euro debt crisis has confirmed that the phase of cheap funding is over
and the cost of country risk is anticipated to remain volatile and above pre-crisis
level also in the mid to long term. It also revealed that euro area is not anymore
homogeneous in terms of risk, as proven by the visible increase in the volatility of
sovereign CDS spread across the board. This confirms that the ‘euro bonus’ is
now substantially lower than in the past. The performance of Estonian CDS
spread following the official announcement of euro adoption next year points in
this direction: while the country risk sensibly decreased during the last months, it




























-1000 -800 -600 -400 -200 0 200







































SUERF2011_1.book  Page 65  Friday, March 11, 2011  9:54 AM66 THE FUTURE OF BANKING IN CESEE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
larcier
Volatility in EMU Country Risk
5Y USD CDS Standard Deviation
Source: Bloomberg.
The world is now slowly recovering from an unprecedented financial and eco-
nomic crisis that has also seriously affected the CEE region. Most countries in the
region have emerged from the trough already at the end of 2009 and in the first
half of this year, GDP headline data improved further across the board in the
region, reinforcing signs that recovery is under way. The details, however, provide
mixed figures as exports emerge as main driver, while domestic demand looks still
depress in many countries. Moreover, regional data entail still large cross-country
differentiation. In the current recovery phase, countries most open to the global
trade cycle are seeing the greatest benefits, with Turkey experiencing the strongest
momentum, while the worst or latest hit countries (mainly Latvia, Lithuania,
Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria) are still lagging behind both in terms of momen-
tum and in terms of levels, and the Greek crisis is not helping.
Looking ahead, we do believe the ‘old’ growth model continues to hold but CEE
countries should pursue it with more cautious emphasising the development of
domestic markets, sound regulation and diversification. Before the crisis, growth
in the region benefited from a process of ‘catching-up’ based on a high degree of
liberalization of trade, capital movements, financial integration and membership
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Capital inflows were however fuelling growth in the context of high and cheap
international liquidity and low perception of country risk. The process was
accompanied by the ‘build-up’ of large external unbalances, with strong con-
sumption and investment growth financed from abroad. Moreover, the huge cap-
ital inflows, recorded in the decade before the crisis, were largely targeting non-
tradable sectors such as real estate, construction and financial intermediation
contributing much less towards the built-up of a competitive and sufficiently
sized manufacturing sector.
Out-of-the crisis, most of such trends will remain in place, but the changing glo-
bal framework will imply a higher cost of international liquidity and risk, mean-
ing a more balanced ‘integration model’. Overall, the long-term potential growth
will be slower than before the downturn, as all the drivers of convergence stay but
are less strong than in the past. A combination of both changed external condi-
tions (e.g. uncertain world outlook and growing competition from Asia, lower
international liquidity and higher global risk, more difficult EU/EMU entry) as
well as internal behavioural responses to the crisis (e.g. higher-than-pre-crisis cost
of country risk, constraint of fiscal spending and further household de-leveraging)
will shape the growth pattern of the region. The long term potential growth will
most probably stay lower than pre-crisis, even if the outlook remains however
more robust than in Western Europe, as the region as a whole has still some catch-
up potential to exploit mainly through further productivity gains.
5.3. A CHANGING MODEL IN CEE BANKING
Banks in CEE held up relatively better than other emerging market banks in pre-
vious crisis but the various banking sectors emerged from the crisis not
unscathed. Deteriorating economic conditions started to take a toll on banking
profitability in the final quarter of 2008, when the international liquidity crunch
spread out and the cost of funding for the local banking sector started to peak.
Despite peaking funding and liquidity risk, fully fledged bank runs were avoided,
and none of the countries experienced a sharp reversal of external financing. Con-
cerns that foreign parent banks would not support their subsidiaries proved to be
unfounded. Overall, cross-border bank flows to the region were not disrupted as
seriously feared, despite the fact that financial markets were seriously hit by the
crisis and the whole region (with the exception for Poland) plunged into deep
recession. The evolution in cross border lending using figures from BIS locational
banking database reveals that the group of countries characterised by high degree
of foreign-ownership and presence of large international players experienced a
relatively higher stability of cross-border flows relative to those with smaller pres-
ence of foreign banks (e.g. Russia, Turkey and Kazakhstan). This represents an
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indirect proof that international banks generally do have a long-term horizon in
funding their local CEE subsidiaries.
Cross-border Lending Towards CEE Economies (in millions of USD dollars)
Note: (1) External loans of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis individual countries banking sector, exchange rate
adjusted changes in gross amounts outstanding, in USD. CEE high denotes the cluster of countries with for-
eign ownership above 60 percent, while CEE low the remaining ones.
Source: UniCredit Group CEE Strategic Analysis.
The international liquidity crunch and the increase in cost of country risk and
funding for the local banking system have been the drivers of a structural changes
however, with implications for the long term. The CEE banking sector develop-
ment of the last decade had been based on such abundant and cheap funding,
which was used to finance lending growth. In the aftermath of the crisis, the loan
over deposit ratio is becoming a structural constraint.
While the liquidity crunch has been the first clear driver of contagion, the full
impact of the crisis on CEE banking materialised only in 2009 with large loan loss
provisions representing a major drag on earnings and the economic downturn
substantially reducing the opportunity for banking business. All over the region,
the share of non-performing loans in total gross loans almost doubled compared
to the end of 2008 to reach 12.8 percent, whereas loan loss provisions topped at
61bn euro marking an increase of 116 percent relative to the previous year
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sub-regions, however, with different magnitude. Whereas Central Europe already
before the crisis showed comparatively good quality of loan book, the sub-region
also benefited from its sound industrial base and relatively lower relevance of
most hit sectors (e.g. construction and real estate) in bank loan books relative to
other SEE and CIS economies. Overall, the non-performing loans ratio in Central
Europe grew only modestly from 3.9 percent (2008) to around 6.7 percent at the
end of last year. The Baltic states have been the most severely hit by the crisis.
Following the large adjustment in economic activity and a bursting real estate
sector, the share of distressed assets in banking books more than tripled to reach
roughly 15 percent. The increase in distressed assets and banks’ provisions was
also remarkable in Kazakhstan following the failure of two leading banks, BTA
and Alliance in early 2009. In the rest of CEE countries, the increase remained
broadly in line with the regional level, with somewhat lower growth being
recorded in the case of Turkey and Russia. A larger increase was instead recorded
in Ukraine also as an effect of the drastic UAH devaluation, with non-performing
loans reaching the level of 30 percent (from 17 percent in 2008).
The deterioration in asset quality has been so far managed well by the CEE bank-
ing sector helped by the high banking sector standards and large capital buffers.
Capital ratios, which were already well above the minimum required before the
crisis, improved further during last year. Even in those countries with issues in
terms of capital, resolution has been fast with state capital injections worth more
than 8bn euro in Ukraine, 36bn euro in Russia and 1.8bn euro in Kazakhstan.
The increase in capital ratios was supported predominately by retained earnings
and by banks efforts to raise capital from both public and private sources, but in
some cases, it also reflected a reduction in risk-weighted assets. The higher sol-
vency buffers generally point to an increase in the capacity to absorb further
adverse shocks. At the same time, when taking into account the level of provision-
ing for distressed assets, it emerges some countries, notably Ukraine, Latvia,
Lithuania and to a certain extent Romania remain exposed to a potential erosion
of their capital ratios resulting from further loan losses.
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CEE Banking System Credit Metrics (2009) (size of the ball = total banking system assets)
Source: UniCredit Group CEE Strategic Analysis.
The deteriorated liquidity conditions first, the economic downturn resulting in no
business demand and increasing risk aversion backed by mounting credit quality
problems played a prominent role in explaining lending weaknesses between
2008 and 2009. As a result, expansion of banking sector loans decelerated
sharply from 14 percent in 2008 to -0.2 percent last year. For the most virtuous
countries (e.g. Poland and Turkey), lending growth remained largely in black ter-
ritory, while credit crunch was more visible in the most hit countries, eg the Baltic
states, and starting from second half of 2009 also in SEE, particularly Romania,
Bosnia and Bulgaria. Some positive support from public sector activities and
guarantees has been recorded in Serbia and to a lesser extent in Croatia. The
household segment has been at the forefront of the contraction, mainly due to
slowdown in demand for loans to finance consumption, while mortgages
remained more stable benefitting from longer maturities and ongoing renegotia-
tion activities. Lending activity on the corporate sector has also been affected due
to the decrease in investment activity and export flows, with more open econo-
mies, such as Central European countries, and the Baltic states having experi-
enced the largest contraction.
As the 18-month storm subsided, banks in Central Eastern Europe entered calmer
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first half of the year unveiled some stabilisation in the dynamic of problematic
assets reinforcing signs that the peak in terms of non performing loans might be
reached between end of this year and beginning of 2011 (with probably one
semester/year lag for Kazakhstan and Latvia relative to the rest of the region).
CEE Impaired Loans Ratio (in percentage of gross loans)
Source: UniCredit Group CEE Strategic Analysis, local CBs.
The peak looks already over in the case of Turkey where the non-performing
loans ratio decreased to 4.4 percent in June this year relative to 5.2 percent in
December 2009, helped also by the ongoing restarting in credit activity. The out-
look appears still challenging for South East European economies, particularly
Romania, as the deteriorated short-term macroeconomic outlook on the back of
sharp fiscal retrenchment might delay the expected recovery in credit quality.
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CEE Lending Activity
(YTD change in total loans as of June 2010, adj for FX movements)
Source: UniCredit Group CEE Strategic Analysis
The recovery has been generally credit-less so far. In the recent months, credit
growth has however re-accelerated with average regional growth standing at
roughly 11 percent (adjusted for FX movements) in the first half of 2010 relative
to the end of last year. The weak demand remains behind the ongoing credit
crunch in a number of CEE countries with banks generally being characterised by
excess of liquidity. In few countries, credit growth is retrieving at faster pace, like
in the case of Turkey where a demand-driven recovery is taking place, and
Croatia and Serbia, where lending activity is backed by the government support.
All over the region, corporate lending has been resuming first from the crisis
marking a 13 percent ytd increase in H1 (adjusted for FX). Loans to the house-
hold sector started to re-accelerate only recently supported by some revival in
lending for consumption purposes, but the overall dynamic is still lagging behind
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CEE Mortgage and Consumer Credit(1)
(Yoy % growth, not adjusted for FX movements)
Note: (1) CEE including PL, HU, CZ, SK, SI, BG, RO, UA, EE, LV, LT.
Source: UniCredit Group CEE Strategic Analysis.
Banks’ deleveraging has been achieved but in a number of countries (e.g. Bul-
garia, the Baltic states, Czech R., Slovakia and CIS) the loan-to-deposit ratio is
still inching down on the back of slowing dynamic in deposits. The solid growth
recorded in bank deposits during 2009 (+10.4% yoy) came to a halt toward the
end of the year and beginning of 2010, as extraordinary deposit collection cam-
paigns put in place by some of the banks started to be abandoned. While a more
balanced loans over deposits ratio was a must in the peak of the crisis, indeed,
banks started to realise that the saving attitude of the country can not be changed
in the short run and fierce competition for funding was becoming inefficient and
detrimental for profitability. Generally, after some further correction in the
months to come and the achievement of sustainable levels, the loan-to-deposit
ratio at the regional level is anticipated to start gradually increase. However, in
those countries which had the strongest gap in terms of domestic funding, as in
the case of the Baltic states, deleveraging might last still for some time.
On the overall, 2010 is materialising equally challenging than 2009 in terms of
banking profitability, as lower provisioning requirements are matched to a lower
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start strengthening only in 2011, tough trends substantially vary among coun-
tries.
Looking forward, the potential of the CEE banking business holds as an oppor-
tunity. However, a number of market conditions will clearly differ after the crisis:
i. return to business requires time and a rebalancing of the banking model. In
the short term, recovery in lending activity is expected to remain tepid and
patchy, with consumers’ demand anticipated to continue lag behind the cor-
porate sector. In line with a lower long term potential growth for the local
economies, in the longer term volumes’ growth is anticipated to re-affirm but
at a more moderate pace compared to the pre-crisis period, with dynamic in
credit generally more tied to the one in deposits and cost of country risk
higher than in the past. Before the crisis, banks have focused on the advan-
tages of cheap external funding to finance lending growth domestically, par-
ticularly in the retail and FX businesses. Going ahead, a rebalancing of the
growth model will require a stronger focus on domestic funding and highly
value added sectors and less focus on retail and FX business, with lending
activities in general less pushing than in the past. At the same time, access to
external funding will continue to represent a key competitive advantage as
the CEE banking sector is expected to remain dependent on financing from
abroad in the foreseeable future;
ii. the tougher post-crisis banking environment might drive further changes in
the competitive landscape. The recent financial crisis amplified and acceler-
ated the consolidation trends of the recent years contributing to change the
competitive landscape across the board. While the current top international
players in the region are anticipated to mostly maintain their position due to
the long-term nature of their presence, opportunities for some repositioning
and new comers could further materialize in specific markets, for example in
connection to the sale of networks by players heavily affected by the financial
crisis or exist of non-strategic investors. Generally, where western groups are
trying to sell chunky assets it is largely because of difficulties in their home
markets. KBC is planning to sell a minority stake in CSOB, its Czech subsid-
iary, this year and preparing for disposals elsewhere, National Bank of Greece
announced the selling of a minority stake in its Turkish unit Finansbank AS
as part of the plan to further strengthen its capital base and in Poland, trou-
bled Allied Irish Banks recently announced Banco Santander has won the ten-
der to buy its Polish affiliate, BZ WBK. Many are selling assets as a cost of
taking government help, while others are streamlining on their own accord.
Higher profits could encourage banks that are considered the winners of the
financial crisis to push the button on deals that have been in the pipeline for
a while. In general, the possibility to leverage on a solid funding base and
capital position, good access to international markets and a specialised busi-
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ness model, other than a good positioning will become more and more key
competitive factors;
iii. the tightening of regulatory requirements might pose a serious challenge for
banks and constrain economic growth. Banks must contend with upcoming
Basel III proposals which are set to tighten liquidity and capital requirements.
Capital requirements are already high relative to the international standards
in the CEE region and the level of capitalisation is more than satisfactory in
most countries with no major need for further generalised strengthening as it
might contribute to delay lending recovery. A critical issue remains instead
the proposed new regulation concerning the implementation of long-term
ratio for liquidity standard, given the structural lack of long-term funding,
particularly in local currency, which characterizes most of CEE countries.
Banks in the region should also deal with tighter regulation of the once prof-
itable practice of providing FX denominated loans. These became a source of
instability during the crisis, when domestic currencies weakened making
loans more costly to service. So far only few CEE countries (i.e. Hungary and
Turkey) introduced measures to ban FX lending, while different proposals are
still debated in the rest of the region and at the European level. Some coun-
tries, also through the coordination of the IMF and the Vienna initiative,
point to the development of constructive solutions to strengthen the local
currency markets, based on country’s specificities. The real risk is that with-
out proper means for long term local funding for CEE banks, a more stringent
regulation might put a constraint to banking and economic growth.
Many governments started also pressing for the introduction of a bank levy
to insure fair burden sharing and rein in systemic risks. In Europe, the imple-
mentation of a bank levy or a tax for financial institutions is currently being
discussed, both at the global European level and at the single country level.
The Hungarian government voted on 22 July to introduce a bank tax and the
German cabinet agreed to adopt a bank levy on 25 August 2010. Sweden has
had in place a levy since 2008. The introduction of a levy is discussed in the
UK, Austria and France, with political debate sometime rising on the issue
also in Poland, Croatia and Romania. So far no coordination or agreement is
reached at the EU level, as the features of the tax and the planned used of
proceedings from the tax are radically different among countries. Generally,
the idea of a levy or a tax on banks might be justified in some countries by
the need to recover part of the resources governments allocated to support the
financial sector during the crisis or by the wish to constitute dedicated funds
for preventing future crisis. The justification is less clear when proceedings
are used for Government budget financing. Moreover, the lack of coordina-
tion at the EU level generates risks of duplications for cross-border banks,
while in case of sensibly high amount of the tax, the risk is that of putting a
further constraint to the recovery.
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In an environment of tougher regulation, lower volumes’ growth and re-emer-
gence of competitive pressures, banks will be confronted with lower profitability
relative to the pre-crisis level but on the overall the CEE banking sector is
expected to remain attractive. Normalisation in credit quality problems will ease
somewhat pressures on banks’ profitability with cost of risk at the regional level
expected to gradually decelerate although remaining above pre-crisis level. Focus
on cost control will stay in the mid term and for those institutions that have seen
their balance sheet shrink by more than their peers, profit-generating capacities
will crucially depend upon their ability to further trim their cost bases. Yet, those
players who want to be able to experience the region’s upside, need to restart
some investment activities as soon as market conditions allow that.
CEE Banking Sector Profitability
Risk-adjusted revenues as percentage of average volumes
Source: UniCredit Group CEE Strategic Analysis.
Overall, the future development in the region shows a quite diversified scenario.
The market attractiveness / risk mix clearly remains in favour of Russia, Turkey
and Romania. Other Central and Southern European countries show good attrac-
tiveness and a low risk profile. The strongest impact of the crisis affected the
Ukraine, Kazakhstan and the Baltic countries, with a clear need for a rebalancing
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Long-term Attractiveness, Risk and Size of CEE Profit Pool
Market Attractiveness (Y axis) and Long-term Volatility of Banking Profitability 
(X axis)(1)
Note: (1) Market Attractiveness is an index ranked between 0 (low attractiveness) and 100 (high attractive-
ness). It is obtained by considering growth potential (50% weight) and profitability (50% weight). Growth
potential is measured in terms of volumes growth, while profitability in terms of ROA. Long Term Volatility
of Banking Sector Profitability means the standard deviation of banking system ROA.
Source: UniCredit Group CEE Strategic Analysis.
5.4. CONCLUSIONS
The paper discusses the impact of the crisis on CEE banking and the need of
change of the banking model. A more balanced macroeconomic environment
characterised by economic convergence but lower than pre-crisis potential
growth, implies the need of some changes in banking as well.
In a context of lower international liquidity and higher cost of country risks,
banks in the region will have to rely much more on domestic funding, thus domes-
tic deposits, matching lending growth to local fund-raising capacity. The loans
over deposit ratio will have to grow over time, but the speed of growth has to
remain much below the pre-crisis levels. Out of the crisis, banking in CEE will
record a pattern of volumes growth less dynamic than pre-crisis one. Lower vol-
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if less strong than in the past) mean a lower revenues generation capacity. Also,
the cost of risk will remain above the pre-crisis level, as those levels were probably
artificially low, due to the sudden development of the market in just a very short
timeframe. In such a context, efficiency remains a priority, meaning strong cost
cutting strategies, but also efficiency enhancing and growth enhancing invest-
ments. On the overall, CEE banking business will remain less profitable than pre-
crisis, still remaining an opportunity compared to more mature markets.
Hand in hand with changes in the competitive landscape in global banking, the
tougher post-crisis banking environment in CEE might drive further changes,
with opportunities for some repositioning and new comers in specific markets. In
that context, the possibility to leverage on a solid funding base and capital posi-
tion, good access to international markets and a specialised business model, other
than a good positioning, will become more and more key competitive factors for
the CEE banks. Challenges ahead for the banking sector in the region include the
growing national regulatory pressures, with moves which are often un-coordi-
nated among countries, as well as Basel III implementation.
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6. DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEMS – LESSONS FROM 
THE CRISIS FOR CESEE BANKING SYSTEMS
Małgorzata Iwanicz-Drozdowska
Abstract
The deposit insurance (guarantee) industry used to attract much attention during
financial crises. In the economic literature it was a moral hazard to prevail in the
research. On the political agenda the level of guarantees has been in focus for a
long time. The recent financial crisis proved that another important issue which
requires in-depth research and strategic decisions is a payout capability (financial
potential) of the deposit insurance industry. In the article the author tries to ana-
lyse the moral hazard and payout capability issues in the context of the recent
crisis as well as to point out the most important lessons for CESEE countries.
6.1. INTRODUCTION
As former FDIC chairman, L. W. Seidman put it, “A deposit insurance system is
like a nuclear power plant. If you build it without safety precautions, you know
it’s going to blow you off the face of the earth. And even if you do, you can’t be
sure it won’t.” This picturesque witticism reflects the problems related to deposit
guarantee systems very well. Moral hazard is one of the leading issues undertaken
by researchers, but actually it is not the only one that should be broadly discussed.
Current financial crises revealed that the payout capability of deposit guarantee
(insurance) institutions is a very important factor for the safety and soundness of
depositors. This issue however has not been widely discussed so far in the litera-
ture and requires in-depth research.
According to the theoretical fundamentals related to the deposit guarantee system
(DGS), it was supposed to have some built-in mechanism to reduce moral hazard
(e.g. a limited level of guarantees, co-insurance, risk-based premiums). Steps
undertaken after the collapse of Lehman Brothers (the second wave of the so
called subprime crisis) destroyed this built-in mechanism since the level of guar-
antees in the EU was significantly raised and co-insurance was cancelled out.
Depositors may feel safe and sound due to a high nominal level of guarantees.
However, one may question safety and soundness, since the financial potential
(payout capabilities) of the DGSs remained almost unchanged. Recent (mid-July
2010) proposals of the European Commission are targeted at improving the
financial situation of DGSs across the European Union.
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From the CESEE banking systems point of view there are at least two other
important issues to be discussed. First of all, have the DGSs from the EU-15 coun-
tries adequate financial potential to cover deposit pay-off for their branches in
other EU countries, especially in CEESE countries. The second question is how
the actual safety and soundness of deposits should be analyzed in the case of the
DGS from home country (e.g. nominal level of guarantees, accumulated funds of
the DGS or the health of public finance of a home country). The author tries to
investigate these two issues in the paper.
6.2. MORAL HAZARD AND POST CRISIS ISSUES
Moral hazard as a phenomenon has attracted much attention in various disci-
plines of economics. In the case of deposit guarantee schemes, researchers tried to
evaluate the impact of the existence of DGS on the banks’ risk taking, banks
failures and banking crises. Results of this assessment do not show a clear rela-
tion. Wheelock & Wilson (1994) and Alston, Grove & Wheelock (1994) found
in their research no relation between the existence of DGS and the number of
bank failures in the American banking sector. According to Karels & McClatchey
(1999) there was no relation between the existence of DGS and risk taking behav-
iour in the American credit unions’ sector. The same conclusion was drawn for
Canadian banks by Gueyie & Lai (2003).
On the other hand Thies & Gerlowski (1989), Grossman (1992), Wheelock
(1992) and Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache (2002) proved, there is a relation
between the existence of DGS and banking problems. Hovakimian, Kane & Lae-
ven (2003) concluded, with a sample of 56 countries, that the introduction of
explicit deposit insurance has had adverse effects in environments that are low in
political and economic freedom and high in corruption.
Gropp & Vesala (2004) conducted research on the impact of the introduction of
DGSs in the EU-15. They concluded that the implementation of DGSs reduced
the level of risk in the banking sector, but in the case of large banks, risk remained
unchanged.
The most recent paper by Angkinand & Wihlborg (2006, 2010) showed the rela-
tionship between the banks’ risk taking and explicit deposit insurance coverage
as U-shaped (in 2010, a sample of 32 countries). Market discipline is weak in the
case of deposit insurance at both high and low levels. Partial (limited) coverage is
likely to reduce the banks’ incentives to shift risk.
It is worth underlining that the focus in the research was on the banks’ behaviour,
not on depositors or other creditors. Moral hazard on the depositors’ side should
be regarded as less destructive than the one on the banks’ side. However one may
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question widely if the existence of DGS is such an important factor for the banks’
risk taking, because there are many other factors determining their behaviour
(e.g. pressure on profitability or market share).
For long-term stability of the banking sector and real protection of depositors, it
is necessary to monitor the risk taking behaviour of banks as well as the sources
of potential instability. This is the task of banking supervisors and central banks.
Deposit guarantee schemes have to rely on their assessment of risk and stability.
But the DGSs should be partners to other safety net players in order to judge on
a proper level of deposit guarantees or the banks’ contributions. Thus, this kind
of research shall be conducted by various interested parties with the important
participation of researchers from the DGSs.
According to Core Principles (no. 2): “Moral hazard should be mitigated by
ensuring that the deposit insurance system contains appropriate design features
and through other elements of the financial system safety net” (BCBS/IADI,
2009). Before the subprime crisis there were some built-in mechanisms for miti-
gating moral hazard. For depositors there were both a limited level of coverage
and co-insurance (e.g. 10%) and for the banks – risk-based premiums and self-
financing of the system. However, those tools were not used in all countries. A
limited level of coverage was used in all EU countries (except the private system
for German banks) and in non-EU CESEE countries1, but co-insurance only in
11 EU countries, within 6 CESEE – EU Members (BFG, 2005). Directive 94/19/
EC required minimum coverage of 20.000 EUR with the possibility of 10% co-
insurance.
Only 8 European countries have used risk based premiums: Finland, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey and Romania. In all EU and other analyzed
CESEE countries the law determines financing of DGSs by the banking sector
with some mechanism for additional (emergency) financing. It is worth underlin-
ing that Directive 94/19/EC did not define the way of DGS financing. Member
States chose very different solutions. According to the industry practice there is
either ex post or ex ante financing and sometimes mixed financing. Ex ante
financing requires all banks to pay premiums periodically in order to accumulate
funds, sometimes to a specific target fund. In the case of ex post, banks pay pre-
miums upon a member bank failure in order to cover deposits payback. The more
sustainable source of financing is ex ante – all banks have to pay solidarily and
the burden in case of any bankruptcy shall be regarded as lower than a onetime
payment. Ex post schemes are pro-cyclical which is also to the detriment of the
banks profits during the economic downturn.
1 The research conducted in 2004-2005 by the Bank Guarantee Fund of Poland staff covered EU Member States,
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Russia, Serbia, Turkey and the Ukraine. The author of this
paper participated in this research.
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Before the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the Icelandic problems there was no
political willingness to increase the level of guarantees in the EU or to change the
way of the DGSs’ financing. After LB’s collapse and the Icelandic crisis, a prompt
decision was taken to increase guarantees up to EUR 50,000 and then to EUR
100,000 (from 31 December 2010) and to cancel co-insurance. In order to avoid
panic among depositors, 10 countries decided to introduce EUR 50,000 (or close
to) guarantees, 8 countries – EUR 100,000, in 5 countries – coverage remained
unchanged (France, Germany2, Italy, Cyprus and Malta3). Some countries
decided to introduce blanket guarantees (Austria – for a specific period of time
only for individuals, Denmark, Slovakia, Slovenia), what means de facto state
financing. According to the EC study (2010), the coverage level of EUR 100,000
is an optimal solution in terms of costs and depositors’ protection, although the
decision was made without prior impact assessment. The current EC estimates
are showing an increase in the amount of covered deposits4 in relation to eligible
deposits5 from 61% to 72% and the number of fully covered deposits from 89%
to 95%. Depositors may feel safe because their deposits are covered to a signifi-
cant extent. This may curtail the depositors’ willingness to look at the financial
standing of the bank and feel responsible for making decisions, but one needs to
keep in mind the lack of professional knowledge across society to assess a bank’s
financial standing. In CESEE countries, the relation of the level of coverage to
average eligible deposit is much higher than in the EU-15 countries due to a lower
level of wealth (e.g. GDP per capita) and lower financial development.
The post crisis (although it is too early to say that it is behind us) picture of DGSs
in Europe is significantly different and still requires changes. In order to improve
the reliability of DGSs in the EU, the EC in July 2010 issued a proposal for
amendment in the 94/19/EC Directive. The key part of this proposal is related to
financing. There are no proposals to restore co-insurance or reduce the level of
guarantees, because the priority is the trust in the banking sector. Besides, cancel-
lation of moral hazard mitigating instruments on the depositors side does not
seem to be important in real life.
6.3. PAYOUT CAPABILITY
The Icelandic case revealed to everyone that the deposit guarantee system must
be sufficiently funded to meet its obligations. The Icelandic system was too young
2 For private deposit guarantees; after the culmination of the crisis Germany raised the level of guarantees in the
mandatory system to EUR 50,000.
3 Cyprus and Malta later increased the level of guarantees to EUR 50,000.
4 According to EC wording: deposits obtained from eligible deposits when applying the level of coverage
provided for in every national legislation.
5 According to EC wording: deposits repayable by the guarantee scheme under your national law, before the level
of coverage is applied.
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and did not present an adequate payout capability6. Besides, financial troubles
were related to large banks. The general assumption of the DGS is to provide
actual coverage of deposits in small and medium sized banks in case of their col-
lapse. According to the EC estimates (2010), the maximum resources available to
the DGSs in the EU range from EUR 27 million to EUR 8.1 billion and the
amount of covered deposits is EUR 5.7 trillion. The state treasury seems to be the
ultimate source of deposit protection, which raises the question about country
default or at least the sources of higher budget deficit financing.
The payout capability of the DGS is difficult to measure since there are no strong
theoretical guidelines and there is a scarcity of publicly available data. It would
be reasonable to apply the rules of the insurance industry (e.g. for property and
casualty), but due to insufficient data it is not feasible. We may, however, apply
at least two basic measures: (1) an accumulated fund7 related to eligible deposits
and (2) an accumulated fund related to covered deposits. It is reasonable to meas-
ure the financial strength of DGS’s in the case of ex ante or mixed financing (21
EU countries; most of the CESEE, except Slovenia). The results of calculation for
2007 are presented in figure 1. For Germany there was no data available. For
three other countries – Lithuania, Poland and Portugal – we used older data
(2005).
On average for the EU-27 the level of the total accumulated fund to total eligible
deposits was 0.20% and in the case of total covered deposits – 0.33%8. Taking
into account the possible target level of accumulated fund of for example 1.5%
of eligible deposits, many countries are far below. Better payout capability is pre-
sented by CESEE countries than by the ‘old’ Member States. After the rapid
increase of the guarantee level, the payout capability was significantly decreased.
The DGSs from countries, which are very active on CESEE markets like, Ger-
many, France, Austria (ex post), Italy (ex post) and Netherlands do not represent
a strong financial potential.
The concentration in the banking sector is an important factor for the assessment
of the payout capability. The higher the level of concentration (e.g. measured with
CR-5), the higher the level of the accumulated fund should be. Out of 8 highly
concentrated countries, only 2 represented an accumulated fund at the level of
2% of total eligible deposits (for details see table 1).
6 Two countries, whose depositors were significantly hit by the collapse of the Icelandic banking system – Great
Britain and the Netherlands – paid deposits back from the own resources.
7 An accumulated fund is the amount of money at the disposal of the DGS, generally from banks contributions
over a certain period of time. An accumulated fund is used for the calculation of the target fund level (or gap).
8 We used data on deposits for 2007 and on accumulated fund for 2008. In the case of using data only for 2007
the ratios are consequently 0.18% and 0.30%.
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Figure 1. Basic Measures of Financial Potential of DGSs
(deposits – 2007, fund – 2008)
Source: own calculations based on EC data.
Source: own calculations based on EC data.





















EE 2,0% ex ante 94,8% SI 0,0% ex post 59,1%
NL 0,0% ex post 86,8% BG 2,0% ex ante 57,3%
FI 0,6% ex ante 82,8% IE 0,3% ex ante 55,7%
LT (2005) 2,0% ex ante 81,2% HU 0,6% ex ante 54,5%
BE 0,3% ex ante 80,8% RO 0,9% ex ante 54,0%
MT 0,1% ex ante 72,8% FR 0,1% ex ante 51,2%
SK 0,1% ex ante 71,5% PL (2005) 0,9% mixed 44,2%
LV 1,0% ex ante 70,2% ES 0,8% ex ante 42,4%
GR 0,9% ex ante 69,5% AT 0,0% ex post 39,0%
PT (2005) 1,2% ex ante 69,1% UK 0,0% ex post 36,5%
DK 0,3% ex ante 66,0% IT 0,0% ex post 33,0%
CY 0,1% ex ante 63,9% LU 0,0% ex post 27,3%
CZ 0,5% ex ante 62,0% DE NA ex ante 22,7%
SE 0,7% ex ante 61,9% EU-27 0,2% 6 ex post 59,6%
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Review of ratios indicated low capitalisation of DGSs, especially in the EU-15
countries and an inadequate level of accumulated funds in highly concentrated
banking sectors. On the other hand we should be aware that the DGS in no coun-
try will be ready for deposit payout in case of large bank failure. But this should
not be treated as an excuse in the case of default of any systematically important
Pan-European bank.
From the depositors’ point of view, actual safety and soundness is based not on a
nominal level of guarantees, but on the financial strength of the DGS. As pre-
sented above, CESEE deposit guarantee schemes are better funded than those
from the EU-15, but CESEE countries are an “importer” of capital in their bank-
ing sectors. Foreign banks subsidiaries have a significant share in their banking
sectors. In the case of subsidiaries it is the DGS in a licensing country responsible
for deposit protection. Home country rule applies in the case of branches and the
protection of depositors lies in hands of the home country’s DGS.
Source: own calculations based on EC data.
In table 2 we have presented the market share of branches in the CESEE. In the
case of the Baltic states this share is significant and also concentration in the
banking sector is high. Both factors indicate weakness in actual depositors’ pro-
tection.
The Icelandic case showed that home country rule may not work in practice. As
mentioned earlier, the Icelandic DGS was not adequately capitalised and was not
able to meet its commitments. In this case it was the host countries (mostly Great
Britain and the Netherlands) to pay back deposits with recourse to Iceland. The
Table 2. Market share of branches from EU countries in CESEE
Country No of branches from 
EU countries
Total assets of 
branches (m EUR)




BG 4 1 741 36 825 4,73%
CZ 15 21 180 155 056 13,66%
EE 11 5 740 22 039 26,04%
LV 6 3 774 32 249 11,70%
LT 7 4 682 26 542 17,64%
HU 10 4 909 124 678 3,94%
PL 18 13 706 263 098 5,21%
RO 10 4 415 84 541 5,22%
SI 3 474 49 010 0,97%
SK 9 4 234 65 509 6,46%
Total for 10 CESEE 93 64 855 859 547 7,55%
EU-27 768 3 319 059 42 208 841 7,86%
10 countries/EU-27 12,11% 1,95% 2,04%
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dispute between the countries has not yet been settled, because of the very high
burden on Icelandic taxpayers. There was only one example in Europe of DGS,
which defaulted to pay, however the list might have been longer, if the govern-
ments had not given their helpful hand to many institutions ‘too big to fail’.
If we compare the level of the consolidated amount of item ‘due to customers’ in
selected credit institutions whose branches are operating in Poland9 to the level
of the accumulated fund of their home country’s DGS, the conclusion is that
Polish depositors placing their money with the branches of credit institutions
have to rely primarily on the good financial standing of the credit institution or –
in second place – in case of failure on the ‘too big to fail’ doctrine and the good
situation in public finance of a home country.
Source: own calculations based on EC data.
Host CESEE countries should evaluate the financial potential of the home coun-
try’s DGS and look carefully at the hosted bank financial standing. This requires
access to adequate information on the financial position of the whole credit insti-
tution as well as the financial position of the DGS. These two issue have not, so
far, been regulated. In the European Commission’s proposal presented in July
2010, there are 3 options discussed related to the exchange of information. The
first one would be a petrified status quo, the second option requires the DGSs,
competent authorities and banks to exchange information, also on a cross-border
basis, to allow the DGSs to prepare for payout when failure is apparent or likely.
The purpose of this is to speed up deposit payout. The most important option is
9 In order to analyze in depth this problem, one should use data on branches operating in all CESEE countries.
This data however is not complete and comparable, therefore the author used a list of branches of CIs in Poland
only. Then the author disregarded those branches which were not accepting deposits.
Table 3. The financial capability to cover deposits of selected credit institutions by the 
home country’s DGS










Due to customers 
consolidated 
(m EUR)
Due to customers / 
accumulated fund of 
home country
Aareal Bank AG DE 41 651 0,53% 21 403 NA
LA CAIXA* ES 271 873 8,04% 134 841 1950%*
Danske Bank/AS DK 416 462 38,14% 108 055 22079%
EFG Eurobank Ergasias S.A. GR 84 269 18,24% 46 808 3031%
KBL European Private 
Bankers S.A.
LU 20 300 2,18% 11 900 ex post
Skandinaviska Enskilda 
Banken AB
SE 221 945 24,67% 53 085 2823%
Société Générale SA  FR 1 023 701 14,17% 300 054 17451%
Svenska Handelsbanken AB SE 204 120 22,69% 52 860 2811%
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the third one, which requires the DGSs to disclose information on its financial
capabilities (ex ante and ex post), complemented by stress tests and peer review.
This information shall be reported to the planned Pan-European supervisor (The
European Banking Authority). Additionally, fulfilling this requirement may be a
precondition for providing cross-border services and opening branches. The sec-
ond and third options are complementary to each other and constitute an alter-
native to the first option. For CESEE countries, option 3 seems to be extremely
important in order to reduce information asymmetry.
The set of EC proposals provides for significant changes in the DGSs financing.
Saying that the status quo is not satisfactory, there is a possibility to apply ex ante
financing, supported by ex post funding, in case it is needed. In a moderate sce-
nario, the DGSs may be financed on an ex ante basis up to 1.5% of eligible depos-
its in an accumulated fund. Funds shall be accumulated within 10 years. Addi-
tionally the DGSs financial resources may be increased by 0.5% of ex post fund-
ing. This may be enough for medium sized bank failure. According to the Joint
Research Centre’s estimates (EC, 2010), on average large bank failure would
require 7.25% of eligible deposits as an accumulated fund collected over 10
years. This figure may be right for the not concentrated banking sectors. The
higher the level of the target fund, the higher the burden on banks, e.g. in the case
of 7.25% target fund, the decrease in operating profits was estimated at 29%, but
in the case of a target fund of almost 2% – a decrease of operating profit was
estimated at less than 5%. This figures prove that reaching high payout capability
by the DGSs translate into a high burden on banks, which seems inevitable, espe-
cially in the case of the DGSs that used ex post financing.
Inter DGSs lending also means a significant change to their financing. In the case
of a shortage of financial resources after using an accumulated fund and ex post
financing, a DGS may ask other DGSs to provide a loan based on specified con-
ditions to be able to pay deposits back. This mechanism may work properly in
the case of problems of an individual medium – sized bank and not for a system-
atically important bank, because the limit for the loan is 0.5% of eligible deposits
of the borrowing DGS.
There are many other issues that need to be discussed, e.g. the maximum level of
ex post financing, contribution base (eligible or covered deposits), risk indicators
(single or multiple, differences in premiums level).
The idea to harmonise – to a higher or lesser extent – DGS financing is right, but
efforts to introduce it are late. A five or ten year period to reach the target level
of the accumulated fund allows putting a moderate burden on banks, but due to
economic cycles may not allow the readiness with proper financing in due time.
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6.4. CONCLUSIONS
One may say that ‘thanks to’ the subprime crisis policymakers started to improve
the legal framework of the deposit guarantee industry in the EU. The European
Commission proposals are heading in the right direction. However, the changes
focus on small and medium sized banks and non-crisis situations. The problem of
dealing with big cross border financial institutions requires much more attention
and is much more difficult to solve.
For CESEE banking systems – as hosts – the moral hazard issue shall be analysed
to a lesser extent in the context of a local bank’s risk taking or depositors behav-
iour, but more in the context of branches of the credit institution’s behaviour and
the risk of non adequate payout capability of a home country’s DGS. In general,
the payout capability shall be analysed with a better theoretical background,
because the use of simple indicators has many drawbacks. One of the most impor-
tant problems is disregarding a country’s specific features.
Access for the host country to supervisory reports on a hosted bank and the finan-
cial potential of the home country’s DGS are important to reduce information
asymmetry. In order to have a clear picture it is necessary to collect (as proposed
by the planned EBA) and publish data on ‘eligible’ and ‘covered’ deposits in each
country and improve transparency in the DGSs’ reports (e.g. level of accumulated
fund, available financing).
The deposit insurance industry must improve its payout capability in order to
provide actual protection to depositors and prepare for the next economic down-
turn.
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7. CHANGES IN RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
AFTER THE CRISIS: THE HUNGARIAN PERSPECTIVE
Petra Kalfmann
7.1. SUMMARY
The objective of this study is to assess how the executives responsible for risk
management of dominant participants of the Hungarian banking sector evaluate
the impact of the crisis on risk management practices. The study focuses on the
conclusions drawn from the lessons of the crisis as a result of the questionnaire
survey conducted with risk management executives of banks.
The executives responsible for risk management of 6 large banks and a mortgage
loan institute who amounted to nearly 60% of the aggregate bank balance sheet
total in 2009 participated in the questionnaire survey. We supplemented the ques-
tionnaire with personal interviews in the case of 4 banks. The survey focused on
several fields: evaluation of the role of the risk management organisation and of
the change of operative risk management practice, the role and risk awareness of
the management and the assessment of the integration of calculated risk param-
eters into strategic risk management and the loan origination process. At the same
time the survey also requested self-evaluation from the respondents: we assessed
what the most critical deficiencies of the risk management field were in the past
years in their opinion and which fields they still considered to be in need of devel-
opment.
The survey revealed that the risk awareness and sensitivity of top managers of
banks had considerably increased since the end of 2008: this was shown by their
increased information need, the content of which has also changed. In close con-
nection with this, indices related to risk represent a rather considerable weight in
the incentive system as well – the priority and indefeasible goal is not growth
anymore, much more emphasis is placed on the formulation and observance of
balanced and sustainable growth strategies.
Based on the survey, the lesson is that risk management methodologies passed the
exam well: the transformation of debtor rating systems and risk parameter esti-
mation methodologies wasn’t really necessary because of the crisis, but that of
risk management processes became important. Judgment criteria, the amount of
required coverage and set limits significantly tightened in both corporate and
retail operative risk management practice, and monitoring particularly strength-
ened on the corporate side, while work-out practice was enhanced in both busi-
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ness lines. Institutions had to fight the greatest difficulties in the field of work-out:
in many cases new processes had to be established on the retail side, as the receiv-
able sales practice exercised before the crisis totally ceased as a result thereof. In
addition, banks place emphasis on proactive work-out activities on both the cor-
porate and retail sides: early warning systems and customer management in the
soft collection phase have been brought to the fore in order to be able to detect
clients that are or will become problematic and to offer them appropriate solution
options.
There is potential for improvement in strategic risk management: the survey
revealed that the results of internal capital adequacy assessment and stress tests
were only integrated into the risk management processes in a small degree. But
institutions are characterised by awareness in this field also: among internal cap-
ital adequacy assessment elements the strongest emphasis was placed on market
risk capital models and reputational risk models and internal processes as an
effect of the crisis and the review of stress test methodologies was indicated by
most institutes as one of the tasks arising from the crisis.
7.2. RISK MANAGERS’ SELF-EVALUATION
The study focused on assessing how risk management executives of banks evalu-
ate the various aspects of risk management in relation to the period between the
end of 2008 until today: the role of the risk management executive and the func-
tion in the organisation, the change of risk management processes related to each
business line, the incorporation of calculated risk parameters into processes, the
sensitivity of the management to risk and the change thereof. The survey is based
on a questionnaire, in which the risk management executives of 6 large banks and
a mortgage bank participated. Banks participating in the survey represented
almost 60% of the aggregate bank balance sheet total at the end of 2009. In the
following sections we present the evaluation of each topic of the questionnaire.
7.2.1. Organisation and governance
The 2nd pillar of the Basel II regulation system requires banks to have a risk strat-
egy adjusted to their business strategy. One group of questions was related to
whether the institute has a risk strategy approved by the board for 2010 and if its
modification has become necessary due to the crisis. Among respondents, five
banks indicated that they had a risk strategy approved by the Board and all the
banks reported the necessity of its modification, which was indicated by four of
them as a considerable change compared to the strategies of previous years. The
content of the changes partly originates from the necessary amendment of busi-
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ness plans but they also mentioned the revaluation of material risks and the
rethinking of the entire loan origination process among reasons.
The basic requirement of prudential laws is the existence of an independent risk
management organisation. However, independence itself does not guarantee that
the weight of risk management is also strong in the organisation, therefore the
other group of questions was related to how the place and role of the risk man-
agement executive had changed since the end of 2008 and how the structure and
headcount of the risk management organisation had changed. Almost all
respondent banks underlined that the risk awareness of the management had sig-
nificantly strengthened since 2008, and the main question is the degree of risk
sensitivity remaining in the management after the end of the crisis. In addition to
risk sensitivity, two banks reported considerable strengthening of the risk man-
agement executive, three banks reported an average small degree of strengthen-
ing, while no change had occurred in the role and place of the risk management
executive according to the self-evaluation of one institute. In accordance with
this, respondents unanimously reported a small degree of strengthening of the
risk management organisation. Organisational strengthening resulted in a head-
count increase at the institutes, mainly the expansion of work-out capacities got
into the focus but several institutes reported considerable restructuring of the risk
management organisation as well.
7.2.2. Risk Management Process
The next group of questions aimed the assessment of how each element of the risk
management process had changed in a breakdown by business lines. We specifi-
cally requested the evaluation of the fields of retail, SME, large corporation and
project financing according to the following risk management elements: judgment
criteria, amount of required coverage, collateral evaluation methodology, rating
methodology, decision-making competencies, customer segmentation, limit set-
ting, monitoring processes and work-out processes.
We particularly assessed the field of work-out: in relation to this, the question
aimed how the fields of soft and hard collection in the corporate and retail seg-
ment were affected by either reorganisation or the establishment of new processes
in relation to the crisis.
Banks evaluated each criteria based on whether any change had occurred in the
given element and if yes, whether it had been of a small or significant degree. We
assigned scores to the answers in order to evaluate results: in case of significant
tightening, we assigned 3 points, in case of a small degree of tightening 2 points,
while we assigned 1 point to the answer if no changed had occurred.
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Institutions commonly reported tightening of risk management processes, the
degree and mix of which was different by business lines. In the work-out field
nearly all responses supported significant restructuring of processes and consid-
erable enhancement of the field. With regard to tightening project financing shall
also be underlined, while in the corporate business lines, contrary to public belief,
there was no general tightening by the ‘banks’.
Chart 1. Evaluation of Changes in the Risk Management Practices of Business Lines and 
Work-out
In the following sections we present the detailed evaluation of each field. Insti-
tutes incorporated the lessons of the crisis into their risk management processes
in different ways in the retail and corporate business lines.
7.2.2.1. Retail Business Line
In the case of the retail business line the highest degree of tightening appeared in
the judgment criteria and the amount of required coverage, parallel to which
almost every institute reported the enhancement of work-out processes. In addi-
tion to the lessons of the crisis, the essence of tightening was further enhanced by
the legislative regulations mandatorily applicable to prudent lending, which were
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that may be undertaken according to various currencies and which, furthermore,
require a fundamentally income based lending practice. Responses prove that the
risk appetite of institutes decreased in the retail segment, the significant tightening
implemented in the judgment criteria and coverage level are not temporary and
may result in the decline of lending activities in longer term.
Chart 2. Evaluation of Changes in Elements of Risk Management in Retail Segment
Respondents reported an additional, small degree tightening in decision-making
competencies, limit setting, monitoring processes and the field of customer seg-
mentation. There is an institute that terminated the decision-making competence
of branches and switched to central decision-making, thereby ensuring an
approach that rather focuses on risk aspects and a more consistent decision-mak-
ing mechanism. In the field of monitoring several institutes underlined the estab-
lishment of the early warning system as an area to be developed. These responses
support that the institutes are interested in identifying the clientele that is most
likely to become non-paying as soon as possible and in starting their handling in
the earliest phase possible. In relation to customer segmentation there were places
where customer grouping was fine-tuned, so that well-standardisable products
can be sold in a more targeted way, behaviour scorecards were introduced in
order to ensure better risk judgment and even the regrouping of the micro-com-
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By assessing further aspects: four institutes reported a minor degree tightening of
the coverage evaluation methodology, while only two institutes tightened the rat-
ing methodology significantly, the others did not modify it in relation to the crisis.
7.2.2.2. Corporate Business Line
In the corporate business line, we requested specific evaluation of risk manage-
ment processes related to SME, large company and project financing. We received
a picture that is slightly different than the retail business line: monitoring proc-
esses, limit setting, judgment criteria and the field of work-out were affected by
considerable tightening, but the degree thereof varied by business line.
In the SME segment, on the one hand monitoring processes were significantly
tightened and restructured, which focused on multi-factor evaluation that also
supports the higher risk sensitivity of banks as well as the conscious approach
that aims the screening and support of customers that are, or will become, prob-
lematic in the earliest possible phase. Additional tightening took place regarding
judgment criteria, the amount of required coverage, work-out processes and limit
setting. Less affected areas are the debtor rating methodology, decision-making
competencies and segmentation.
Chart 3. Evaluation of Changes in Elements of Risk Management in Corporate Segment
All in all the picture shows that institutes saw/see considerable risks in the SME
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did not cover that –, which resulted in significant restructuring and tightening of
the loan origination process, in addition to placing a strong emphasis on moni-
toring and work-out processes, mainly to follow the activity of enterprises in the
portfolio affected by the crisis and to efficiently establish preventive actions.
Processes similar to those in the SME segment took place in the large corporate
segment. More considerable tightening can be observed than in the SME segment
regarding monitoring processes, which was unanimously reported by the insti-
tutes; furthermore in the field of work-out and limit setting. In addition to these,
judgment criteria and decision-making competencies were also tightened. Areas
less affected than the SME segment are the rating methodology and the related
fields. As there are no processes that can be standardized in the large corporate
business line, individual bank practices are less comparable too, therefore nearly
all institutes pointed out that since cases are judged individually, considerable
tightening may be implemented in the criteria that are applied during judgment,
and higher decision-making levels suggest the growth of risk sensitivity.
During the crisis, the sharpest business activity reduction occurred in the field of
project financing. All in all, in the corporate business line the most important
tightening took place in this field. Judgment criteria, limit setting, monitoring
processes, the process of work-out and decision-making competencies were con-
siderably tightened at nearly all respondents without exception. Further tighten-
ing characterizes the amount of required coverage, which shows in higher
expected self-financed contribution in this case.
7.2.2.3. Work-out
In relation to the crisis, work-out processes were focused on and revalued at every
bank. The questionnaire proves that all institutes without exception reported
considerable enhancement of corporate and retail work-out processes.
The main emphasis is placed on early prevention on the corporate side. The objec-
tive of the banks is to detect problematic customers in an early phase and to offer
or jointly establish a solution for them, as a result of which they may become
performing clients again.
On the retail side, one of the challenges for banks was the establishment of the
work-out field, as market practice was the sale of problematic cases in packages
before the crisis, which fully froze and declined as a work-out solution during the
crisis. On the retail side, similarly to the corporate one, the early preventive phase
and the soft collection phase were enhanced: the goal is earlier problem recogni-
tion and the proactive handling thereof.
Regarding headcount, institutes reported considerable expansion in both fields.
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7.2.3. Quantification of Risks and Their Use
All respondents underlined the risk awareness of the bank’s top management as
one of the lessons and results of the crisis. Risk aspects got to the fore during
decision-making, thus decision-makers must possess appropriate information
about them.
On one hand, this group of questions was intended to assess how often the man-
agement receives risk reports and on what degree did its expectations change
regarding the content and frequency of reports. The rest of the questions were
aimed at how much quantified risk measures were incorporated into the loan
origination and decision-making processes. We dealt with the use of stress tests
and their integration into strategic risk management as separate topics.
7.2.3.1. Risk Reports
Banks’ top managers receive comprehensive risk reports on the aggregate risk
indices, capital intensiveness and portfolio quality at each respondent bank
monthly. Three banks reported reports more frequent than this (weekly and daily)
but the content of these reports is much narrower and concentrates on certain
partial areas. The need for such more frequent reports basically arose from the
crisis.
The content of the reports varied in the case of each institute: three banks
reported significant changes. The change of content of risk reports also supports
the enhancement of risk awareness and the need for information that had not
been focused on earlier at management level.
7.2.3.2. Application of Risk Parameters
Quantification of risks and the implementation thereof in the loan origination
process is one of the cornerstones of conscious risk management. Not all of the
respondent banks are institutes using the IRB method, but despite this the quan-
tification of risks, that is, PD and LGD calculations are present at every bank.
This group of questions was related to whether the institute applies its own esti-
mated – either validated or estimated in an expert way – risk parameters in pro-
visioning, risk-based pricing, risk management processes and in the field of CRM
(customer relationship management).
All respondent banks apply risk parameters in the risk management process; with
one exception they apply them in risk pricing in either a direct or indirect way;
five institutes indicated use in the field of provisioning and four banks in the
CRM field. Answers clearly show that risk awareness appears in the measure-
ment of risks and the conscious use thereof in certain aspects of loan origination
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(PD values assigned to ratings, coverage limits, decision-making levels and com-
petencies).
It is especially positive, that expected loss elements calculated based on risk
parameters represent a part of the risk pricing systems, which, according to our
expectations, will play a dominant role as competitive factors in upcoming years.
With the risk approach incorporated into the pricing policy they can ground
much more conscious competitive strategies and the Hungarian bank sector has
unambiguously shifted into this direction.
Risk parameter estimation methods were criticised in relation to the crisis: in
what degree can standard applied methodologies be used to quantify the risks of
periods, such as the recession in 2008-2009; what is the chance of underestimat-
ing risks? Four of the respondent banks indicated that modification of the PD
method did not become necessary specifically due to the crisis; one institute indi-
cated a small degree of amendment, while further two reported considerable
modification. The rate is similar in case of LGD methods, too: four institutes did
not deem modification of the methodology necessary, two institutes indicated
minor, while further one institute considerable degree amendment. These answers
partly show that banks consider the applied methods grounded, mature and
robust enough.
7.2.3.3. Stress Tests
In relation to the crisis, the importance of stress tests and their integration into
risk management has been mentioned several times in international legislation as
well. The legislative background related to Basel II requires Hungarian bank mar-
ket players also to use stress tests.
This group of questions focused on whether banks apply stress tests in strategic
risk management and whether stress tests used so far have been reviewed in rela-
tion to the crisis. Among respondents four institutes indicated that they use the
results of stress tests in strategic risk management. The most frequently men-
tioned field of utilization was the determination of the internal capital adequacy
level – results appear as input in capital planning, the elaboration of the risk
strategy and lending processes.
Five institutes indicated the need for review of stress tests in relation to the crisis:
in the case of three banks, stress scenarios had to be modified considerably. It is
a good message to supervisory bodies that the crisis had an effect – banks more
consciously evaluate potential impacts of extreme situations on risk levels that
were or can be taken.
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7.2.3.4. Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP)
Based on the survey the results of the economic capital calculation are not integral
parts of risk management processes. Only three of the respondent banks men-
tioned that it used the results of the economic capital model in the risk manage-
ment process. Several banks underlined as the one of the reasons for this that as
the regulatory capital requirement of Pillar 1 is higher, they consider it the effec-
tive capital burden, thus the result of the economic capital calculation is not inte-
grated into the risk management process.
This set of questions also covered whether the economic capital models used in
Pillar 2 had to be reviewed in relation to the crisis, and if yes, did this mean the
review of the existing model or the use of a new method?
Chart 4. Evaluation of Changes in Elements of Economic Capital Methodologies
Among risk types, most banks (four-four) mentioned the necessity of modifying
market risk and reputational risk measurement; among them three banks men-
tioned to be modified significantly the market risk capital model and the internal
model or process applied for reputational risk. This result is definitely interesting
and clearly shows the content and impact of the crisis. During the backtesting of
VaR methods used for market risk by banks, the review of methodologies has
become definitely necessary due to the increased volatility of market risk factors,
which simply arises from the essence of the VaR method as well, thus it is not
surprising. The outcome of the review resulted in the increase of allocated capital
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As for reputational risk, the result is surprising, although not unexpected: the
anti-bank mood mainly arising internationally during the crisis but also spiralling
into the domestic market drew the attention of every institute to the importance
of reputational risk, thus conscious improvement of customer relationship man-
agement and regular measurement of the quality thereof as well as continuous
monitoring of news published about the bank in the press were brought to the
fore in the case of an increasing number of banks.
Also four banks mentioned the review of the liquidity risk methodology: two
institutes needed considerable, while the rest only minor modification. None of
the banks allocate capital for liquidity risk but internal processes required review:
limits were tightened, reporting requirements were enhanced, the detection of
illiquid positions was focused on.
Four banks mentioned the review of the banking book interest risk method as
well, but significant modification was necessary in one case only. This is
explained by the change of the market risk methodology. Review did not cause
the rise of the capital requirement in case of any of the banks.
The credit risk method had to be modified in the case of three banks: in one case
significantly, while in the other two cases only to a small degree. In two cases the
review resulted in the rise of capital requirement. This can primarily be explained
by the deterioration of loan portfolios. Also three institutes emphasized the mod-
ification of the operational risk method, but these amendments did not become
necessary in relation to the crisis.
7.2.4. Incentive System
The inappropriate incentive system of banks’ top managers, in which risk aspects
did not really play a role in the period of growth preceding the crisis, has been
attacked by critics several times in connection with the crisis. The need for incor-
porating long term incentives was formulated towards management incentive sys-
tems in international regulations and based on that, domestic supervisory direc-
tives as well.
During the crisis internal incentive systems were significantly transformed at
domestic institutes, too: risk aspects were incorporated in case of each bank. It is
especially positive that most banks mentioned risk aspects playing an important
role in the performance evaluation of business fields. Certainly the degree and
way of incorporation varies: the weight of risk elements is between 10% and
70%, in function of the management level. In case of four banks risk based per-
formance evaluation is built on an RAROC-type index, while in case of the other
institutes the portfolio quality and its trend mean the basis of assessment.
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7.2.5. Deficiencies and Areas To Be Improved
The last set of questions in the questionnaire was designed to assess what banks
consider the most important deficiencies in risk management of the past years
with consideration to the crisis and which fields they plan to improve. During fill-
in the provided criteria had to be evaluated on a scale of 1-10, where the largest
deficiency and activity to be improved the most received 10 points (no order had
to be set, but criteria had to be evaluated individually).
If we consider factors that received a score of 5 or higher as critical elements, the
following evaluation arises. Banks deemed the lack of appropriate IT support as
the most critical factor in the field of deficiencies and they evaluated this factor
as the area to be improved the most as well. In this regard full consensus arose
among institutes: all respondents indicated IT support as a critical factor to be
improved.
Chart 5. Evaluation of Deficiencies and Areas To Be Developed
Among deficiencies the lack of risk controls is the second most critical factor. Five
institutes indicated this factor as critical. There are still things to do in this field
as well: the improvement of risk controls is in second place among areas to be
developed, too. Although only four institutes indicated this factor as an area in
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In the field of deficiencies, regarding the average score the underestimation of
risks and the lack of internal risk management professional capacity factors
received a score close to 5. Five banks indicated the underestimation of risks as
critical deficiency but institutes achieved significant progress based on self-evalu-
ation in this area: only three institutes assess it as a critical area to be improved
in the future. This suggests that the elaboration and use of the estimation method
of risk parameters improved the judgment and evaluation of risks. When assess-
ing the internal professional capacity, most banks mentioned inappropriate head-
count as a deficiency and they also feel this area as a critical field in need of
improvement.
Only three banks indicated the inappropriate incentive system as a critical defi-
ciency, but four institutes find it a critical field to be improved: despite the positive
trend of the past period it seems that there are still things to do in this area, too,
mainly in increasing the risk awareness of business fields. Also three banks con-
sidered the unsuitability of applied risk methods as a critical deficiency, but only
two as an area to be improved: institutes made significant progress in the estab-
lishment of statistics-based based rating systems and risk parameter estimation
methods in the years preceding the crisis, primarily by preparing for the imple-
mentation of the Basel II regulatory system, thus, although there is always room
for improvement in this field, but there are basically good grounds to build on.
The independence of risk management factor is rated last among both deficiencies
and areas to be developed. Only two banks deemed it a critical deficiency and one
bank as improvable, which can partly be explained with the set-up of the right
structures already before the crisis, furthermore, the improvement of this field is
also owed to the implementation of the Basel II regulatory system, which requires
that each institute establishes an independent risk control function.
The lack and necessary development of management’s risk awareness was men-
tioned as an additional critical factor among both deficiencies and areas to be
improved, and in close connection with this, permanent sustainability of a risk
conscious corporate culture, the concept of responsible banking, implementation
of the results of Basel II preparations in the risk management process and the need
to enhance monitoring processes.
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SUERF – SOCIÉTÉ UNIVERSITAIRE EUROPÉENNE DE 
RECHERCHES FINANCIÈRES
SUERF is incorporated in France as a non-profit-making Association. It was
founded in 1963 as a European-wide forum with the aim of bringing together
professionals from both the practitioner and academic sides of finance who have
an interest in the working of financial markets, institutions and systems, and the
conduct of monetary and regulatory policy. SUERF is a network association of
central bankers, bankers and other practitioners in the financial sector, and aca-
demics with the purpose of analysing and understanding European financial mar-
kets, institutions and systems, and the conduct of regulation and monetary policy.
It organises regular Colloquia, lectures and seminars and each year publishes sev-
eral analytical studies in the form of SUERF Studies.
SUERF has its full-time permanent Executive Office and Secretariat located at
the Austrian National Bank in Vienna. It is financed by annual corporate, per-
sonal and academic institution membership fees. Corporate membership cur-
rently includes major European financial institutions and Central Banks. SUERF
is strongly supported by Central Banks in Europe and its membership comprises
most of Europe’s Central Banks (including the Bank for International Settle-




For details of SUERF Studies published prior to 2010 (Nos. 1 to 22 and 2003/1-
2009/5) please consult the SUERF website at www.suerf.org.
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